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1.  INTRODUCTION 
With the increasing number of transnational investment 
transactions worldwide, many countries have signed different 
international investment agreements (IIAs), bilateral or multilateral, 
with other countries to stimulate market openness and attract more 
foreign direct investments (FDI) to improve their economies.1  These 
terms contain obligations.  National security is one of the exceptions 
that exempts states from the obligations assumed.2  As such, the 
national security exception mainly assuages the protectionist 
concerns of participants in sovereign wealth funds (SWFs).3  The 
fundamental concern is how to balance national security against 
market liberalization.4  On one hand, the host state has to protect its 
                                               
1  International investment or capital flows fall into four principal categories: 
commercial loans, official flows, foreign direct investment (FDI), and foreign port-
folio investment (FPI). Foreign direct investment (FDI) pertains to international in-
vestment in which the investor obtains a lasting interest in an enterprise in another 
state. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Invest-
ment Report 2015, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2015 (2015) available at 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1245 (re-
porting that the global expansion of FDI is currently being driven by over 65,000 
transnational corporations with more than 850,000 foreign affiliates).  
2  See, e.g., Cathleen H. Hartge, China’s National Security Review: Motivations and 
the Implications for Investors, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 239 (2013) (exploring the Chinese 
decision to review foreign investments in domestic companies to ensure there are 
not national security implications). 
3  See generally Rumu Sarkar, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Furthering Development or 
Impeding it, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1181 (2008); see also Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign In-
vesting in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State Owned 
Enterprises and the Chinese Experience, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 
(2009) [hereinafter Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis] (describing the evo-
lution of attitudes towards SWFs and foreign sovereign’s involvement in domestic 
markets);  Xiaolei Sun et al., China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments in Overseas 
Energy: The Energy Security Perspective, 65 ENERGY POL’Y 654 (2014) (exploring how 
China focuses investments on energy sectors and how that affects the energy secu-
rity of the state). 
4  See MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34336, SOVEREIGN WEALTH 
FUNDS: BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2008) (showing the benefits 
and issues of SWFs and the hopes for guidelines to be established by international 
institutions like the IMF); Robert M. Kimmitt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the World 
Economy, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 119 (2008) (setting out the questions associated with SWFs 
and hoping to set up a better understanding of the issues which would promote 
stability in the global economy); see also Yvonne C. L. Lee, The Governance Of Con-
temporary Sovereign Wealth Funds, 6 Hastings Bus. L. J. 197 (2010) (considering the 
current world of foreign investments and how SWFs increase in prevalence coin-
cides with increased flow from ‘non-Western’ countries); Joel Slawotsky, The Regu-
lation of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments in the United States, 29 BANK. & FIN. SERV. 
POL’Y REPORT 1 (2010) (looking at possible ways for the United States to improve its 
regulatory scheme with respect to SWFs); Brendan J. Reed, Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
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own citizens; while on the other hand, the foreign investors are 
concerned about being discriminated against due to an abuse of 
protective measures by the host state.  Such protective acts may also 
bring further political tensions.5  The issue of sovereign investment 
has attracted attention because of its opaqueness.6  Because 
governments are involved, some suspect that the true motives of 
sovereign investment are politically driven.  Many SWFs lack 
transparency, so the host state cannot determine whether the 
intentions of such investment are genuinely commercial or whether 
the investment will jeopardize national security and financial 
stability.7  Governments believe that if strategic industries fall under 
foreign control, the foreign government will take advantage of this 
control to attack the host state.8  For instance, assuming that a 
foreign state acquires a telecommunication company, it is 
reasonable to assert that there could be a leak of confidential 
information by surveillance.9  Especially after the 9-11 terrorist 
attack, these concerns have prompted some countries to regulate 
and restrict sovereign investment in certain sectors, such as 
                                               
The New Barbarians at the Gate? An Analysis of The Legal and Business Implications Of 
Their Ascendancy, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 97 (2009) (analyzing the pros and cons of 
SWFs); Paul Rose, Sovereign Wealth Funds Investment in the Shadow of Regulation and 
Politics, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1207 (2009) (probing the increase in SWFs and the assorted 
interests of all of the relevant parties). 
5  See, e.g., Justin O’Brien, Barriers to Entry: Foreign Direct Investment and the 
Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 42 INT’L LAW 1231 (2008) (evaluating the con-
cerns and hopes of SWFs and the reaction from governmental regulators); Javier 
Santiso, Sovereign Development Funds, 58 POL’Y INSIGHTS 1 (2008) (investigating the 
incredible possibilities for SWFs if they choose to start focusing on development 
finance and helping the developing world); Doug Palmer, Rise of China State-Owned 
Firms Rattles U.S. Companies, REUTERS, Aug 17, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/ar-
ticle/2011/08/17/us-usa-china-bigcompanies-idUSTRE77G3Z320110817 (compar-
ing the relative power in the global economy between America and China). 
6  See generally Yvonne C. L. Lee, A Reversal of Neo-Colonialism: the Pitfalls and 
Prospects of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1103 (2009); Adrian B. Wignall 
et al., Sovereign Wealth and Pension Fund Issues, FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS 117 
(2008). 
7  See Gordon L. Clark & Eric R. W. Knight, Temptation and the Virtues of Long-
Term Commitment: The Governance of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment, 1 ASIAN J. 
INT’L L. 321 (2011) (advocating for a more long-term perspective in response to 
SWFs and using the Australian SWF as an example of what should be done). 
8  See Patrick J. Keenan, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Social Arrears: Should Debts 
to Citizens be Treated Differently than Debts to Other Creditors, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 431 
(2009) (showing that SWFs treat “two masters with very different agendas”). 
9  See Maurizia D. Bellis, Global Standards for Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Quest 
for Transparency, 1 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 349 (2011) (presenting the impact of SWFs using 
two focuses: global standards and transparency). 
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telecommunication and commodities.10  Even though there are 
studies which indicate that such restrictions are unnecessary, 
governments should always guard against such harm.11  Some argue 
that these measures are over-protective and discriminatory against 
FDIs, and the measures are a breach of international economic law.  
The European Union (EU) is the world’s largest outward foreign 
direct investor and, at the same time, the world’s leading recipient 
of such foreign direct investment (FDI).12  The flows of international 
investments into Europe reflect the EU’s open policies regarding the 
movement of capital.13  Importantly, while these inward investment 
flows include capital from SWFs these represent only a minor share 
of the total FDI transactions per year.  Nevertheless, the EU and its 
members have abandoned their liberal approach towards foreign 
FDI when it comes to SWFs.  In recent years, some EU member states 
have even expressed the fear14 that SWFs are lining up for a 
shopping spree that would bring many EU companies under the 
heavy influence of foreign governments. 
                                               
10  See generally Michael Knoll, Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth Funds to Invest in the United 
States? 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 712 (2009);  Matthew A. Melone, Should The United States 
Tax Sovereign Wealth Funds, 26 B. U. INT’L L. J. 143 (2008) (exploring the possible 
ways for the US to react to the increase in SWFs in its economy, particularly using 
tax policy); see also Mark E. Plotkin, Foreign Direct Investment by Sovereign Wealth 
Funds: Using the Market and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
Together To Make the United States More Secure, 118 YALE L. J. 88 (2008) (studying the 
protections that are available to ensure the SWFs act appropriately). 
11  See generally Arina V. Popova, We Don’t Want To Conquer You; We Have 
Enough To Worry About: The Russian Sovereign Wealth Fund, 118 YALE L. J. 109 (2008). 
12  In 2013, the inward flows (into the EU) amounted to 327€ billions while the 
outward flows (EU to the rest of the world) amounted to 341€ billions. In terms of 
percentage, EU inward stock (34% of world inward investment) while the outward 
stock (46% of world outward investment). For the official EU statistics, see Eurostat 
Portal available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/newxtweb. 
13  Such a liberal policy was recalled in the October 2015 strategy communica-
tion published by the European Commission.  See European Commission, Trade for 
All: European Commission presents new trade and investment strategy (Oct. 14, 
2015) (Press Release) (available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/in-
dex.cfm?id=1381) [hereinafter Trade for All], the full text of the Communication is 
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tra-
doc_153846.pdf; See generally Ramon Torrent, The Contradictory Overlapping of Na-
tional, EU, Bilateral, and the Multilateral Rules on Foreign Direct Investment: Who is 
Guilty of Such a Mess?, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1377-99 [hereinafter Torrent]. 
14  See Lars-Hendrik Röller & Nicolas Vérnon, SAFE AND SOUND: AN EU 
APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT (2008) [hereinafter Röller & Vérnon] (describ-
ing the double-edged sword of SWFs, the need for the money to be flowing in and 
a general aversion to the potential implications of allowing a foreign sovereign to 
invest within a state). 
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These concerns are worrying politicians, and national 
regulations are now in place to screen investments from SWFs.  
Reacting to this trend, the European Commission decided to 
promote a common European approach to sovereign investment, 
i.e., to define at the EU level what policy responses and regulations 
should and should not be allowed for member states to utilize.15  
Such an intergovernmental approach aims at supplementing 
national regulatory responses by supranational efforts that intend to 
remain voluntary in nature. 
Why a EU approach? As usual the Commission states that “a 
common EU approach would maximize European influence in these 
wider discussions.”16  Even more important is the fact that, if the EU 
fails to agree on a common line, individual member states will 
possibly resort to measures of their own.  These resulting barriers 
would very likely impede the fundamental free movement of 
capital, not only from outside the EU but also within common 
European market.  Such an “un-coordinated series of responses 
would fragment the internal market and damage the European 
economy as a whole.”17  
This article seeks to analyze the existing legal regime applicable 
to SWFs in the EU and to assess its capacity to answer the call for 
control, while maintaining the attractiveness of the EU market as an 
investment location.  Firstly, we define the concept of SWFs and 
present the main trends of SWF investment in Europe as well as the 
main concerns regarding their effects.  Secondly, we critically 
analyze the current regulatory framework within the EU and this 
will lead us to suggest particular amendments to the relevant Treaty 
provision.  Thirdly, we explore the EU contribution to promoting a 
multilateral approach for the regulation of the SWFs’ operations.  
  
                                               
15  For a political and legal examination of the EU decision-making process in 
external economic policy, see Julien Chaisse, Promises and Pitfalls of the European Un-
ion Policy on Foreign Investment—How Will the New EU Competence on FDI Affect the 
Emerging Global Regime, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 51 (2012) [hereinafter Chaisse, Promises 
and Pitfalls] (analyzing the effects of moving the decision-making on investment 
treaties from individual countries to the EU). 
16  A Common European Approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds, EUR. PARL. 
DOC., COM (2008) 115 provisional, 6 [hereinafter Commission Communication 2008]. 
17  Id. at 7. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/3
 
2015] DEMYSTIFYING SECURITY EXCEPTION 589 
2.  SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN THE CONTEXT OF RISING STATE 
CAPITALISM 
 
‘State capitalism’ is usually described as an economic system in 
which commercial economic activity is undertaken by the state in 
the form of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  Also, the management 
and organization of these SOEs’ means of production is in a 
capitalist manner.  Ming Du stated that state capitalism is the 
Chinese economic system, and that it is fundamentally different 
from Western liberal market capitalism.  Also, the substantial reason 
that state capitalism has been developed in China is because the 
Chinese government has transformed the nation’s economy from a 
command one to a market one (i.e., socialism with Chinese 
characteristics).  The way that the Chinese government exercises 
‘state capitalism’ is that it directly or indirectly controls a large 
number of powerful SOEs, especially in the strategic and key sectors 
(e.g., China Sinopec).18  Kratsas and Truby argue “the interests of 
sovereign and private investors clash” through state-directed 
capitalism and accept Keynes’s maxim that “international cash 
flows are always political,” and Kratsas and Truby have stated that 
it is problematic.19  
 
2.1. Operations of SWFs in Europe 
 
The increasing presence of SWF investment in the EU, much as 
in the United States, has given rise to various concerns regarding 
sovereign investment in the EU market.20  Protectionist tendencies, 
already an area of concern in the EU, could be further provoked by 
this rise in SWF activity.21  Owing to the geography and historical 
                                               
18  See Ming Du, China’s State Capitalism and World Trade Law, 409 (2014) (ex-
ploring how China’s use of state owned enterprises has completely overtaken the 
Chinese economy and how this could be a major problem with the WTO’s interpre-
tations of the legality of state owned enterprises). 
19  See Georges Kratsas & Jon Truby, Regulating Sovereign Wealth Funds To Avoid 
Investment Protectionism, 95 J. FIN. REG. 114, 121 (2015) [hereinafter Kratsas & Truby] 
(evaluating the issues with the current responses to the increases in SWFs globally 
and specifically in the US). 
20  See Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis, supra note 3 (exploring the 
flow of Chinese savings to finance the US’ current account deficit). 
21  See Julien Chaisse, Debashis Chakraborty, & Jaydeep Mukherjee, Emerging 
Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Making: Assessing the Economic Feasibility and Regulatory 
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rivalry on the European continent, however, EU governments are 
perhaps more concentrated on investments from Russia.22  At the 
same time, the US market remained a more attractive destination for 
foreign investors during the Global Financial Crisis.  These two 
variables explain to some extent the different perceptions on the two 
sides of the Atlantic and the differences in terms of regulatory 
approach.  The important difference lies in the fact that the EU, in 
terms both of regulation and policy, declares, as a principle, that all 
restrictions on the movement of capital involving member states 
(both with other States in the EU and with states outside the EU) 
should be banned.23  It thus extends the liberalization of capital 
movements to and from third countries whatever the investor class.  
This traditional positive perception of foreign investments explains 
to a large extent why the EU has expressed a general trust with few 
concerns and has also largely welcomed SWFs investments over the 
last few years.  Concerns, however, exist and they have contributed 
to generating tensions between national governments and the 
supra-national level. 
Investments of SWFs in international capital markets, including 
in Europe, have increased greatly in recent years. While the lack of 
transparency makes it very difficult to have fully comprehensive 
analysis of SWFs’ operations, reports suggest that Europe is an 
important destination for SWFs’ investments.24  As a result of the 
financial crisis and the ensuing recession, the need for international 
investment in the EU has also been growing and will continue to 
grow as suggested by the recently announced EU "Investment 
Plan."25  Some of these investments come from countries whose 
political regimes are considerably less liberal than those in EU 
                                               
Strategies, 45 J.W.T. 837 (2011) (exploring the issues a government may face as they 
begin to set up a SWF). 
22  See Stephen Jen & Oliver Weeks, Celebrating the Birth of Russia’s SWF 1 (2008) 
(estimating that while Russia’s new SWF is relatively small at the beginning it will 
become a massive SWF in just a few short years if oil prices remain high). 
23  This principle of freedom movement of capital between member states and 
between member states and third countries is subject to limited exceptions. See 
TFEU, infra note 104, at Article 65 § III(B). 
24  See infra note 26. 
25  The Investment Plan for Europe aims to revive investment in strategic pro-
jects around Europe to ensure that money reaches the real economy.  See Jyrki Ka-
tainen, Investment Plan, EUROPA.EU (last visited Dec. 3, 2015), http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/priorities/jobs-growth-investment/plan/index_en.htm (describing the 
Investment Plan for Europe as a package of measures to unlock public and private 
investments in the real economy of at least € 315 billion through 2017). 
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countries.  There is, however, an informational problem with SWFs, 
which is partly due to a lack of transparency and clear 
communication on the part of the funds themselves.  There are no 
exhaustive figures of SWF activities in the EU common market.26  
However, it has been reported by many newspapers that many of 
the larger and more prominent SWFs, including the Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority (ADIA), the Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation (GIC), the Qatar Investment Authority 
(QIA), and the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), are active in 
Europe.  However, the value of their investments, although 
important, remains at a lower level than the investments made in 
the US market.27  SWFs invest in very diverse sectors and industries, 
although there is a certain predominance of investment in services.  
Primarily, it appears that investments of SWFs in Europe are less 
frequent than in the United States.28  Consequently the security 
issues in the EU are not as pressing as they are in the United States.  
This explains to a large extent the soft position adopted in Europe, 
balancing concerns with foreign investment with an overall trust for 
SWFs.  
 
2.2. European concerns about SWFs 
 
In the particular case of Europe, four concerns are brought to the 
fore by SWF investments.  Firstly, the role and involvement of 
governments in SWF strategies is called into question.  Secondly, the 
                                               
26  A study on the investment operations of 18 SWFs in 2014 found that the 
European Union received $16.4 billion, making the EU the second most important 
destination for SWFs’ investments.  The same study suggests that $11.7 billion goes 
to UK, which leads the recipient EU countries, followed by Italy, Netherlands, 
France, Spain and Germany.  TOWARDS A NEW NORMAL: SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND 
ANNUAL REPORT 2014, Bocconi University, 28-29, http://www.uniboc-
coni.it/wps/wcm/connect/83cfaeaa-d5fd-4021-8021-
15104503a863/SIL_Report_2015.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.  Another study, which uses 
a different methodology, suggests that Spain has been the main recipient, receiving 
$ 8.34 billion, ahead of France, the UK and Germany.  Sovereign Wealth Fund Re-
port 2014, ESADEgeo, 8, 
https://www.kpmg.com/ES/es/ActualidadyNovedades/ArticulosyPublicacion
es/Documents/sovereign-weath-funds-v2.pdf. 
27  See generally WILLIAM MIRACKY et al., ASSESSING THE RISKS: THE BEHAVIORS OF 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2008).  
28  See Steffen Kern, SWFS and Foreign Investment Policies – An Update 8 (2008) 
(assessing the current outlook for SWFs and looking at the policies that have gotten 
them here). 
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lack of transparency of SWFs is also a cause for concern.  Thirdly, 
the alleged political objectives of SWFs are feared because they may 
turn SWFs into secretive government investment vehicles.  Finally, 
some might find the shift in the balance of power in the world 
economy from Western industrialized countries to new emerging 
market giants difficult to accept.29  These four issues are considered 
below.30 
Firstly, liberals advocate free market forces and commercial 
activity.  In a free market, the relationship between supply and 
demand will work itself out and weed out those goods and services 
that are less profitable.  This market, with freedom of choice as to 
what an individual buys, does not need any interference by the 
state.31  Since the inception of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, EC policies 
have shunned the role of the states and have discouraged 
government intervention in economic and financial affairs; a 
decisive step was achieved with the 1987 Single European Act (SEA) 
the main effect of which was to set a deadline for the creation of an 
encompassing single market by 1992.32  The 20-year period 
following deregulation and the removal of border restrictions in the 
Common Market provided fertile ground for corporate activity, and 
private corporations have grown rapidly in size and influence.  As a 
result, the activity of SWFs is a cause for concern since it contradicts 
                                               
29  See Gerard Lyons, State Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 14 L. 
& BUS. REV. AMS. 5 (2008) (exploring the growth of SWFs in the past 60 years). 
30  See Matthew Saxon, It’s Just Business, Or Is It?: How Business and Politics Col-
lide With Sovereign Wealth Funds, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 693 (2009) (an-
alyzing how political interests are being infused into businesses with SWFs and the 
potential dangers this causes); see also Heike Schweitzer, Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
Market Investors or “Imperialist Capitalists”? The European Response to Direct Invest-
ment by Non-EU State-Controlled Entities, 2 EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. 79 (2011) [here-
inafter Schweitzer] (considering the ways in which Europe has responded to the 
explosion of SWFs globally). 
31  See Bryan Druzin, Restraining the Hand of Law: A Conceptual Framework to 
Shrink the Size of Law, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 100, 110-12 (2014) (evaluating the complex-
ity of governmental intrusion into the market and showing the view of many right-
leaning economists that informational complexity of the market “fundamentally 
precludes the possibility of successful central market planning”). 
32  The Single European Act (SEA), 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1; see Ingolf Pernice, The 
Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 349 (2009) 
(showing the new structure created by the Treaty of Lisbon which units countries 
in a supranational way without hopes of forming a state). 
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the trend of reducing the involvement of governments in the EU and 
global economy.33 
Secondly, the operations of SWFs are often obscured, with 
disclosure limited to the regulatory compliance obligations imposed 
by host states.  However, the same is true for hedge funds, which 
are a relatively lightly regulated investment fund.  The light 
regulation applicable – or even sometimes the absence of any 
regulation – means that they may not be obliged to disclose their 
holdings either completely or in part.34  Further, it has been argued 
that SWFs, although similar to hedge funds without long-term 
investment objectives, are less transparent than hedge funds and 
therefore more worrying.35  One can also observe significant 
inconsistencies in the SWF disclosures.  The Norwegian SWF (The 
Government Pension Fund–Global) provides perhaps one of the few 
exceptions to the practice of limited disclosure.36  Overall, SWFs 
usually lack transparent structures and management processes that 
are domestically and internationally accountable.  They work in an 
opaque way, publishing neither statistics on their composition nor 
                                               
33  See also Remarks of Nathalie B. Osterwalder, EUR. PARL. HEARING ON 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (Nov. 9, 2010) (presenting a new way of looking at for-
eign investments and hoping to increase transparency in these arenas). 
34  The EU is proposing to tighten the regulatory regime of its hedge fund in-
dustry by: (1) limiting hedge funds’ borrowing; (2) imposing a registration require-
ment for funds with more than US$134 million under management; and (3) impos-
ing limits on pay, among other regulations. See Nikki Tait & Martin Arnold, 
European Union Hedge Fund Plans Under Fire, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e7a4df78-c416-11df-b827-00144feab49a.html (re-
porting that considerations of regulating hedge funds and private equity had the 
potential to be a big problem in Europe); see also Nikki Tait, Ben Hall, & Tom 
Braithewaite, French Pave Way for EU Hedge Fund, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, available 
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c3c5e8b2-d15a-11df-96d1-00144feabdc0.html 
(stating that France and Germany are in favor of the proposed legislation and out-
lining how France’s dissipating opposition allowed for passage of regulating hedge 
funds).  
35  See, e.g., Edwin M. Truman, Four Myths about Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
VOXEU.ORG 1 (2008), available at http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1539 
(debunking four popular myths about SWFs). 
36  See Simon Chesterman, The Turn to Ethics: Disinvestment From Multinational 
Corporations for Human Rights Violations—The Case of Norway’s Sovereign Wealth 
Fund, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 577, 577-82 (2008) (evaluating how Norway, one of the 
world’s largest petroleum exporters, has invested its oil wealth in a fund with a 
market value, at the time, of more than US$ 350 billion making it Europe’s largest 
SWF, and second only to the UAE); see also Anthony Wong, Sovereign Wealth Funds 
and the Problem of Asymmetric Information: The Santiago Principles and International 
Regulations, 34 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 1081 (2009) (exploring possible solutions to the 
problems that the world faces with the increasing prevalence of SWFs). 
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on their investments and strategies.37  For this reason, even the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) has had to rely on a collection of 
estimates by private financial institutions to assess the size of these 
funds.38  There has been a slight, yet very important and positive 
improvement since 2014 (when the International Forum of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds first published a partial compliance-
assessment of fifteen SWFs with the Santiago Principles).39 
Thirdly, if the role of governments, through and within SWFs, is 
more utilized than classical economic theory requires, it follows that 
investment decisions by public investors, and by the SWFs in 
particular, are not made solely in search optimal risk-adjusted rates 
of return.40  Currently there is no evidence that SWFs have or will 
control firms to implement governmental policy.  However, host 
countries cannot summarily assume that SWFs investments will 
never be guided by political objectives or that the management of 
SWFs will never be motivated by ‘nationalistic considerations’ 
deviating from conventional wealth maximization.41  One may 
wonder, can a government use its SWF as a financial instrument to 
achieve a political objective?  Russia and China are regularly singled 
out as countries with major strategic and political interests shown in 
                                               
37  The scope and scale of SWFs further increases the potential for deliberate or 
accidental financial disruption. In a period of global financial turmoil such as at the 
present, concerns as to the responsibility of SWF managers to act in a stabilising 
manner will continue to be prominent. 
38  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-946, SOVEREIGN WEALTH 
FUNDS: PUBLICALLY AVAILABLE DATA ON SIZES AND INVESTMENT FOR SOME FUNDS ARE 
LIMITED 11 (2008) (finding that that only thirteen countries separately reported their 
SWF holdings in public IMF documents). In the absence of official national or inter-
national public reporting, much of the available information about the value of 
holdings for many SWFs is from estimates by private researchers who project funds 
sizes by adjusting any reported amounts to reflect likely reserve growth and asset 
market returns. Id. at 17.  
39  See Santiago Principles: 15 Case Studies, International Forum of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds (Nov. 2014) http://www.ifswf.org/pst/SantiagoP15Cas-
eStudies1.pdf . 
40  See Roland Beck & Michael Fidora, The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on 
Global Financial Markets, European Central Bank Occasional Paper Series, No. 91, at 
14 (July 2008) (examining how the increase of SWFs impacts the flow of global cur-
rencies). 
41  See Joshua Aizenman & Reuven Glick, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Stylized Facts 
about their Determinants and Governance 23 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Working Paper No. 14562, 2008) (outlining how the goals of the SWF will dictate 
how risky the assets it invests in will be). 
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their SWF usage.42  These countries also have strategies to control 
critical assets, such as infrastructure, and this raises issues of market 
integrity as well as concerns over national security.43 
Fourthly, the rise of SWFs is a sign of the shift in the world 
economic balance of power away from Western industrialized 
countries and towards new emerging market giants like China, the 
oil-rich Middle East, and perhaps even India.44  According to Philipp 
Hildebrand, capital has: 
[H]istorically tended to flow from the core of an economic 
system to its periphery . . . sovereign wealth funds play a 
potentially important role in this apparent reversal.  The 
sense that capital is increasingly flowing from the periphery 
to the core is raising a variety of political sensitivities in the 
core countries.45  
The rise of SWFs is more than the addition of a new asset class.  
The growth in size and importance of SWFs is a reflection of the new 
role of developing economies which illustrates a shift in emphasis 
in the global economy.  In recent decades, the rule was for Western 
companies and portfolio investors to invest in developing countries, 
while now one may observe that “the growing capital surpluses in 
developing countries will seek out profitable investment 
                                               
42  See Julien Chaisse et al., Expansion of Trade and FDI in Asia: Strategic and Pol-
icy Challenges 40 (2009) (discussing how companies engaged in industries of strate-
gic importance to the development of China, such as natural resources and infra-
structure, have been supported so actively by government authorities that one may 
consider that China ‘built’ some of its Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and how 
the acquisition of strategic assets and capabilities such as brands, distribution net-
works, and foreign capital markets, and so on, is often supported by the Chinese 
government). 
43  See Edward Greene & Brian Yeager, Sovereign Wealth Funds—A Measured 
Assessment, 3 CAP. MKTS. L. J. 247 (2008) [hereinafter Greene & Yeager] (exploring 
the different objectives of different state actors in their having SWFs). 
44  See Sanjay Dutta, Government Plans Sovereign Wealth Fund, TIMES OF INDIA, 
Sep. 17, 2013, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Govt-
plans-sovereign-wealth-fund/articleshow/22643338.cms (detailing plans for an In-
dian SWF to materialize as indicated by Indian officials); see also Archana 
Chaudhary, Coal India to Use Planned Sovereign Fund to Buy Mines, BLOOMBERG (July 
8, 2010, 12:40 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-07-07/coal-
india-may-use-proposed-sovereign-fund-to-acquire-mine-assets-overseas (report-
ing that any proposed Indian SWF would be set up with the clear intention to help 
state companies compete for overseas energy assets with China). 
45  Philipp M. Hildebrand, The Challenge of Sovereign Wealth Funds, VOX: CEPR’S 
POLICY PORTAL (January 21, 2008), http://www.voxeu.com/in-
dex.php?q=node/881.  
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opportunities in developed economies.”46  In some cases this is 
achieved through private sector investment, but since many 
emerging and developing countries do not (for various reasons) 
have privately owned companies of sufficient size to invest 
significantly in industrialized countries, this is increasingly done by 
SWFs. 
 
3.  BALANCING CAPITAL FLOWS AND NATIONAL SECURITY: THE EU 
INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS 
 
National security is the idea that a state must keep its property 
safe in order to protect its citizens.  This is a concept that a 
government, along with its law-making bodies (e.g., parliament(s)), 
should protect the state and its citizens against all kinds of ‘national’ 
crises through a variety of power projections.  Projections of power 
may manifest itself in such ways as political power, diplomacy, 
economic power, military might, and so on.  In this respect, there is 
a unique national security challenge for policy-makers posed by 
SWFs due to concerns about their legitimacy and integrity as 
investors.47  SWFs may be used for political purposes by those 
sovereign owners, which might threaten the political and economic 
security of the states in which they invest.  Christopher Cox, the 
chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, 
commented that these government-controlled funds may not be 
created for investment returns and could be in pursuit of other 
government interests.48  Some have expressed a fear that these 
investments could give those state investors access to sensitive 
security information of the host state in the infrastructure, energy, 
and technology sectors.  At least, those state investors may gain 
control of those critically important industries, acquire proprietary 
knowledge, sensitive technology and scarce resources by 
                                               
46  See Julien Chaisse et al., Expansion of Trade and FDI in Emerging Asia: Strategic 
and Policy Challenges 84 (2009). 
47  See Meg Lippincott, Depoliticizing Sovereign Wealth Funds Through Interna-
tional Arbitration, 13 CHI. J. INT’L L. 649, 651 (2013) [hereinafter Lippincott] (positing 
that accountability through international arbitration motivates SWFs to behave as 
private investors).  
48  See Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
440, 513 (2009) (noting that significant investments by the Abu Dhabi fund in the 
United States threaten American policy-makers’ “future ability to oppose Abu 
Dhabi on matters related to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, terrorism or military 
concerns, or other diplomatic efforts” for fear of economic retaliation). 
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purchasing a controlling stake in those companies.  In order to 
address these issues, the international economy provides some 
principles that must be respected by the EU and its member states.49  
As such, WTO law, and its specific agreement on trade in services—
the GATS—provides a first regulatory framework which is 
complemented by the international investment agreements that 
have been concluded by the EU and its member states. 
 
3.1. Implications for SWF Investment from the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services 
 
Since most countries involved in FDI are WTO members, WTO 
law becomes a principal method of solving any legal problems.  This 
applies to EU member states, which are all WTO members and 
hence bound by the rules of the multilateral organization.50  This 
section will first discuss why the GATS is more relevant and when 
the GATS is applicable in the context of SWFs, then it will illustrate 
some major roles of the national security exception under the GATS, 
and lastly it will examine some underlying problems.  Within the 
WTO treaties, the GATS is more relevant and important in the 
context of SWFs because it is the only legally binding law in relation 
to investment.51  
Although the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) 
does contain an article about ‘security exception,’52 and thus is 
theoretically applicable, its principles are relatively limited.  Some 
scholars consider that GATT is too general.53  Even with its 
investment-related reference treaty, the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), the GATT is still short of 
specific discipline.  It means that the general principles provided 
may not be applicable to some specific investments, whereas the 
                                               
49  See generally Torrent, supra note 13. 
50  Id. 
51  See Bart de Meester, International Legal Aspects of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Rec-
onciling International Economic Law and the Law of State Immunities with a New Role of 
the State, 20 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 779, 801 (2009) [hereinafter de Meester] (evaluating the 
global legal framework for SWFs). 
52  Article X, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.  
53  See generally Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, Currency Undervalua-
tion and Sovereign Wealth Funds: A New Role for the World Trade Organization 1 (Peter-
son Institute, Working Paper No. 08-2, 2008).  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
   
598 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:2 
TRIMs do not give enough additional support and reference.54  On 
the contrary, the GATS is more relevant when talking about FDIs 
like SWFs because FDI nowadays trends towards the service sector.  
The purpose of GATS is to make sure the service sectors are 
liberalized for foreign investment,55 including state investments like 
SOEs and SWFs, by “facilitating the freedom of capital inflows in the 
service sector.”56  Hence, it is more specific yet flexible to be applied 
to service-related FDIs.57  The GATS is applicable to FDI when the 
investment takes the form of ‘commercial presence’ mode in the 
service sectors in the EU economy, meaning that the foreign investor 
holds at least 50% ownership.58  Therefore, only when SWFs tend to 
take control of the target company in the EU will the GATS be 
applicable.59  
To promote market liberalization in service sectors to foreign 
investors, the GATS imposes obligations on the host states.60  
However, these obligations are subject to the general exceptions and 
specific exceptions that allow the EU and its member states to 
deviate from the rules.  The GATS Article 14bis ‘security exception’ 
is the illustration of the general exceptions regarding national 
security that the host state can rely on to refuse foreign investments.  
The purpose of this exception is to ‘preserve members’ freedom of 
                                               
54  See Fabio Bassan, Host States and Sovereign Wealth Funds, Between National 
Security and International Law, 21 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 165, 172 (2010) [hereinafter Bas-
san] (examining the efficacy of current regulations on SWFs). 
55  See de Meester, supra note 51, at 800-01 (detailing the reduction in cross-
border trade barriers instituted by GATS).  
56  See Efraim Chalamish, Global Investment Regulation and Sovereign Funds, 13 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. J. 645, 661 (2012) [hereinafter Chalamish] (determining that 
governmental attempts to block cross-border investment by SWFs violates commit-
ments in international law).  
57  Bassan, supra note 54, at 173.  
58  Chalamish, supra note 56, at 660-61.  
59  Bassan, supra note 54, at 174.  
60  See Julien Chaisse et al., Deconstructing Service and Investment Negotiating 
Stance: A Case Study of India at WTO GATS and Investment Fora, 14 J. WORLD INV. & 
TRADE 44, 54-55 (2013) (observing that general obligations are imposed on the host 
states based on the most-favored nation (MFN) principle, whereas obligations re-
lated to market access and national treatment are imposed only in specific service 
sectors); see also Julien Chaisse, Assessing the Relevance of Multilateral Trade Law to 
Sovereign Investments: Sovereign Wealth Funds as “Investors” under the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services, INT’L REV. L. 1 (2015), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5339/irl.2015.swf.9 [hereinafter Chaisse, Assessing the Rele-
vance of Multilateral Trade Law] (analyzing the impact of GATS as a liberalizing de-
vice for SWFs). 
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action in areas relating to national defence and security.61  The article 
provides that the states are excepted from the non-discriminatory 
obligations imposed when the investment concerns ‘essential 
security interest.’62  It is reasonable for the host states to enforce 
necessary actions to restrain the access of FDIs to defend their 
national security interests and uphold public safety and stability.  
The GATS plays an important role in the context of sovereign 
investment because it liberalizes markets for foreign investments.63  
It is suggested that the GATS “provides a useful framework for 
avoiding national measures that restrict investments by SWFs 
endanger an open investment client, while at the same time ensuring 
that WTO Members can protect important interests.”64  
The GATS promotes market liberalization by imposing 
obligations upon the members, including the EU, while allowing the 
states to make exceptions, including the national security exception, 
under GATS Article 14bis, when there is a need for national 
protection.  In the context of SWFs, the national security exception 
helps to balance the control of national security and investment 
opportunities. 
Originally, foreign investments were genuinely for commercial 
purposes, but because governments fund the foreign investments, 
some states will be suspicious of the true purpose behind them.  
There are two possibilities:  that the government in control of the 
SWFs truly tends to attack the host state via SWFs and SOEs, or that 
the SWFs and SOEs are purely for commercial purposes but the host 
government abuses the national security exception to reject the 
investment because of political reasons.  Under the former scenario, 
the exception is a shield for the host state to block potential threats 
to its national security; under the latter scenario, the exception acts 
like a protector to escort the SWF throughout the process.  Studies 
show that most sovereign investments are purely for commercial 
purposes because there is no meaningful benefit in spending so 
much money and time to indirectly attack another sovereignty via 
                                               
61  Chaisse, Assessing the Relevance of Multilateral Trade Law, supra note 60, at 12.  
62  Art. XIVbis, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marra-
kesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 
U.N.T.S 183. 
63  See Chaisse, Assessing the Relevance of Multilateral Trade Law, supra note 60, 
at 4-5 (detailing how GATS encourages liberalization through positive list ap-
proaches). 
64  de Meester, supra note 51, at 811. 
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SWFs.65  Hence, the rejected cases are considered an abuse of the 
security exception.66  So, some scholars believe that the exception 
would “level the playing field with other investors and prevent host 
states from politically retaliating against a state by denying SWF 
investments.  This is an important aspect of liberating SWFs from 
becoming political battlefields.”67  Therefore, the national security 
exception is a protector that depoliticizes SWFs and encourages 
trade liberalization.  
Some scholars believe that the national security exception under 
WTO law provides a forum to cope with protective measures 
against SWFs.68  Because the GATS is legally binding between the 
WTO members and the WTO, the WTO may exercise its political 
influence/control towards those who breach the law, and it offers a 
preferred platform for sovereignties to tackle related issues and to 
make appropriate decisions or concessions accordingly.  With the 
power and influence of WTO and the treaty, both parties can 
negotiate and end up with a win-win solution.  However, the 
national security exception can only be a very partial solution to the 
matters raised by protective measures against SWFs.  The exceptions 
should be “interpreted in conjunction with other provisions in the 
same treaty” but not alone69 because the GATS Article 14bis is only 
one of the articles and it addresses only the exceptions.  In addition, 
the exception under the GATS does not specifically give exemptions 
to sovereign investments.70  There may be other general exceptions 
or even specific exceptions in the GATS or even other provisions in 
the GATT or TRIMs that contradict the national security exception.  
As a result, it is uncertain whether the national security exception 
                                               
65  See, e.g., David Murray, SWFs: Myths and Realities, (Keynote Address) 
Global Sovereign Funds Roundtable, May 5, 2011, http://www.ifswf.org/pst/lon-
don11.pdf. 
66  See Kratsas & Truby, supra note 19, at 98-102 (detailing the relative opacity 
and history of investment patterns among SWFs). 
67  Lippincott, supra note 47, at 664. 
68  See Chalamish, supra note 56, at 663-65 (surveying the various means by 
which GATS-issued exceptions applies to investments by SWFs); see also Locknie 
Hsu, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 451, 457 (2009) [hereinafter Hsu] (assessing the impact 
WTO agreements have on SWFs).   
69  See Susan Rose-Ackerman & Benjamin Billa, Treaties and National Security, 
40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 437, 465 (2007-2008) [hereinafter Rose-Ackerman & Billa] 
(weighing the impact of GATS Article XXI on a 1985 trade embargo between Nica-
ragua and the United States). 
70  See Hsu, supra note 68, at 457 (noting the limited scope of the WTO’s Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Investment Measures binding participating members).   
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article will prevail over the others.  Therefore, the national security 
exceptions can provide only limited guarantees to the SWFs.71  
However, the exception creates another underlying matter, 
which limits the achievement of the liberalization goal.  Most 
authors agree that the phrase ‘essential security interest’ creates a 
degree of uncertainty regarding reliance on the exception.  The 
causes of the uncertainty are that the WTO has not provided any 
clear definition in clarifying the scope of the term “essential 
security,”72 and also because different states hold different notions 
regarding the phrase.73  It is uncertain when the host states will reject 
the foreign investments in breach of any obligations.74  It is unclear 
what kinds of FDI will prompt the host states to invoke the security 
exception.75   
This lack of clarity results both in unpredictability for foreign 
investors to plan their future investments and an unfriendly 
investment environment that may discourage further sovereign 
investment.  Because of the uncertainty, either the host state or the 
foreign government can easily rely on and easily make use of the 
exception.76 Firstly, the WTO has not clarified the scope of the 
national security exception.  Secondly, there is inadequate case law 
to illustrate the correct use of the exception, to what extent, and to 
which service sectors the exception is applicable.  
The unpredictability of the WTO law and the protective 
measures imposed by the host state create a barrier to entry for 
SWFs in the EU and elsewhere.  Hence, this will possibly result in 
counter-effects, which do not harmonize the market but worsen the 
relationships between the member countries, or even foster political 
revenge.  
                                               
71  See Bassan, supra note 54, at 196 (detailing the policy rationale behind the 
limited applicability of GATT and TRIMs rules to SWFs).  
72  See Hsu, supra note 68, at 464 (considering the implications of the vagueness 
in defining “essential security” for foreign investors).  
73  See Bassan, supra note 54, at 190 (detailing various state interpretations of 
the ambiguity behind “essential security”). 
74  See Claudia Annacker, Protection and Admission of Sovereign Investment under 
Investment Treaties, 10 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 531, 551-554 (2011) (discussing the multiple 
theories of jurisdiction concerning investor-state relations).  
75  See Chaisse, Assessing the Relevance of Multilateral Trade Law, supra note 60, 
at 13-14 (affirming the difficulty of defining what categories of investment are ap-
plicable to the GATT national security exception).  
76  See Bassan, supra note 54, at 177 (detailing the ambiguity of the GATS Annex 
on financial investors and SWFs). 
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3.2. The International Investment Treaties Approach 
 
In addition to the WTO law, IIAs have become popular between 
countries to promote market liberalization and to create more 
investment opportunities. This section focuses on discussing how 
the national security exception in IIAs deals with SWFs by looking 
at some significant examples.  
Since December 2009, investment is part of the EU’s common 
commercial policy.77  As a consequence, the European Commission 
may legislate on investment.  The European Commission outlined 
its approach for the EU’s future investment policy in its 
Communication “Towards a comprehensive European international 
                                               
77  See, e.g., Marc Bungenberg, The Division of Competences between the EU and 
Its Member States in the Area of Investment Politics, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, SPECIAL ISSUE: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
AND EU LAW 29-42 (Bungenberg et al. eds., 2011) (discussing the reasons for the 2009 
EU transfer of competencies with member states in international investment pol-
icy); Marc Bungenberg, Going Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After Lis-
bon, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 123-51 (Christoph 
Herrmann et al. eds., 2010) (describing the challenges EU policy after the Treaty of 
Lisbon faces in light of economic competition with the U.S. and China); Marc 
Bungenberg, The Politics of the European Union’s Investment Treaty-Making, in THE 
POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 133-61 (Tomer Broude et al. eds., 2011) 
(detailing the interaction of law and politics in EU bilateral investment treaty mak-
ing); N. Jansen Calamita, The Making of Europe’s International Investment Policy: Un-
certain First Steps, 39 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 301-30 (2012) (evaluating 
main issues facing EU in developing international investment policies); Jan 
Ceyssens, Towards a Common Foreign Investment Policy? – Foreign Investment in the 
European Constitution, 32 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 259-91 (2005) (as-
sessing that European Constitution’s foreign investment policy will lead to greater 
cooperation between EU and member state policies); Joachim Karl, The Competence 
for Foreign Direct Investment: New Powers for the European Union?, 5 J. WORLD INV. & 
TRADE 413-448 (2004) (addressing the possible implications of an EU competence 
for foreign direct investment on member states); Marcus Klamert & Niklas Maydell, 
Lost in Exclusivity: Implied Non-Exclusive External Competences in Community Law, 13 
EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 493-513 (2008) (asserting the existence of implied exclusive 
competencies is affirmed by recent opinions from the European Court of Justice); 
Jan Kleinheisterkamp, The Future of the BITs of European Member States after Lisbon, 
29 ASA BULLETIN 212 (2011) (contending European Commission’s claim of exclusive 
competence will politicize discussion in investment treaty arbitration); Markus Kra-
jewski, External Trade Law and the Constitution Treaty: Towards a Federal and More 
Democratic Common Commercial Policy?, 42 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 91-127 (2005) 
(determining whether European Constitution Treaty democratizes and federalizes 
EU common commercial policy); Torrent, supra note 13 (asserting that the bilateral 
investment treaties of EU member states contradict the EU Court of Justice’s juris-
prudence).  
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investment policy” in 2010.78  This policy contributes to the 
objectives of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, set out in the 
Europe 2020 Strategy.79  However, since 2009, a dual regime exists 
which provides for the existence of both EU member states’ 
investment treaties and newly negotiated EU investment treaties.80  
                                               
78  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: Towards 
a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, COM (2010) 343 final (July 
7, 2010) [hereinafter Communication from the Commission to the Council].  
79  Communication from the Commission: Europe 2020 – A Strategy for Smart, Sus-
tainable, and Inclusive Growth, COM (2010) 2020 final (March 3, 2010). 
80  In three judgements, the CJEU sided with the Commission by ruling that 
Austria, Sweden, and Finland did not take appropriate steps required by ex-Article 
307(2) EC (now Article 351 TFEU) to remove incompatibilities of their pre-accession 
BITs provisions on free transfers related to investment (transfer clause) with regard 
to restrictive measures the Council may take under the Treaty Articles on the free 
movement of capital ex-Articles 57(2), 59 and 60 (1) EC. Case C-205/06, Comm’n v. 
Austria, CURIA (2009), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/docu-
ment_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=lst&docid=7264
0&occ=first&dir=&cid=62326; Case C-249/06, Comm’n v. Sweden, CURIA (2009), 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&do-
cid=72641&pageIn-
dex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=62508; Case C-
118/07, Comm’n v. Finland, CURIA (2009), available at http://curia.europa.eu/ju-
ris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=73856&pageIn-
dex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=62669. This rela-
tively complex regime is not discussed here. Interested readers may refer to a rich 
literature on the topic. For a critical review, see Torrent, supra note 13 (asserting that 
EU member states’ BITs contradict the CJEU’s jurisprudence concerning the distri-
bution of competences among the European Community and its member states); 
see generally P. J. Kujiper, Foreign Direct Investment: The First Test of the Lisbon Im-
provements in the Domain of Trade Polity, 37 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 261 
(2010); see also Lars Markert, The Crucial Question of Future Investment Treaties: Bal-
ancing Investors’ Rights and Regulatory Interests of Host States, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, SPECIAL ISSUE: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
AND EU LAW 145-71 (Bungenberg et al. eds., 2011); Niklas Maydell, The European 
Community’s Minimum Platform on Investment or the Trojan Horse of Investment Com-
petence, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW IN CONTEXT 73-92 (August Reinisch & 
Christina Knahr eds., 2008); Carsten Nowak, Legal Arrangements for the Promotion 
and Protection of Foreign Investments Within the Framework of the EU Association Policy 
and European Neighbourhood Policy, in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW, SPECIAL ISSUE: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND EU LAW 105-38 
(Bungenberg et al. eds., 2011); Federico Ortino & Piet Eeckhout, Towards an EU Pol-
icy on Foreign Direct Investment, in EU LAW AFTER LISBON 312 (Andrea Biondi et. al. 
eds., 2012); August Reinisch, The Division of Powers Between the EU and its Mem-
ber States “After Lisbon,” in EUROPEAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW, SPECIAL ISSUE: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND EU LAW 43-54 (Bungen-
berg et al. eds., 2011); Mavluda Sattorova, Return to the Local Remedies Rule in Euro-
pean BITs? Power (Inequalities), Dispute Settlement, and Change in Investment Treaty 
Law, 39 LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 223-24 (2012); Chaisse, Promises and Pit-
falls, supra note 15, at 52; Wenhua Shan, Towards a Common European Community 
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These investment treaties provide a layer of regulation on SWFs’ 
investment that the EU and the member states must respect.81  
There are two major types of IIAs to be discussed:  bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs), and preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs).  BITs are signed by two countries bilaterally; PTAs, 
however, are multilateral and usually take forms of free trade 
agreements (FTAs).  One significant FTA is the North America Free 
Trade agreement (NAFTA), concluded between North American 
countries.  Since IIAs are signed by a number of countries, there 
usually are negotiations between parties before the agreement is 
concluded.  The IIAs are therefore mostly customized based on the 
needs and conditions of the relative parties, and this increases the 
transparency of the regulations and restrictions.  Hence IIAs more 
realistically protect both foreign investors and host countries.82 
Such features of IIAs help to promote and encourage FDI around 
the world.  The IIAs also promote FDI by compromising on the 
dispute settlement mechanisms.  Firstly, clearer definitions of 
investors in some BITs give predictability and certainty to foreign 
investors.83  This brings comfort to the foreign investors on how the 
IIAs protect them in case of disputes.  Also, due to the rise of SWFs, 
some BITs even contain clauses about state–state dispute resolutions 
with a narrower scope.84  The state–state disputes provision with a 
narrower scope, yet greater certainty not only encourages 
negotiations instead of arbitrations, but also allows SWFs to claim 
                                               
Policy on Investment Issues, 2 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 603-25; Wenhua Shan & Sheng 
Zhang, The Treaty of Lisbon: Half Way Toward a Common Investment Policy, 21 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 1049-73 (2010); Jörg Philipp Terhechte, Art. 351 TFEU, the Principle of Loyalty 
and the Future Role of the Member States’ Bilateral Investment Treaties, in EUROPEAN 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, SPECIAL ISSUE: INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND EU LAW 79-94 (Bungenberg et al. eds., 2011). 
81  The strategy, announced in October 2015, points to the next steps for the 
new EU approach to investment protection. See Trade for All, supra note 13, the full 
text of the Communication is available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/do-
clib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf. 
82  See Lippincott, supra note 47, at 660-61 (examining the protective benefits of 
bilateral investment treaties). 
83  See Chalamish, supra note 56, at 652-53 (discussing how the definition of an 
‘investor’ varies across BITs and how the different definitions can affect the likeli-
hood of foreign direct investment). 
84  See Lippincott, supra note 47, at 662-63 (analyzing the narrower scope of the 
state to state disputes provision in contrast to the investor-state disputes provision). 
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for damages due to any violation of IIAs.85  Therefore, the additional 
transparency, predictability and certainty achieved by the 
customized features of IIAs and the clear procedural dispute 
settlement mechanisms provided give a higher level of protection to 
either party.86  This helps investors to plan carefully and wisely in 
order to achieve higher return.  Thus, IIAs help to encourage FDIs.  
The aim of IIAs is to promote trade liberalization between 
countries.87 In this respect, the EU’s investment policy is focused on 
providing EU investors and investments with market access and 
with legal certainty and a stable, predictable, fair, and properly 
regulated environment in which to conduct their business.88 
The clauses are based on the principles of most-favored nation 
(MFN) or national treatment (NT).  However, countries still have to 
be wary of any investments that may jeopardize their national 
safety.  Therefore, most IIAs also explicitly include national security 
exceptions to ensure that the treaties protect themselves.  However, 
the difficulty is how the parties strike a balance between national 
security and MFN/NT obligations by control.  The following 
examples show their positions in the context of the exception under 
different situations. NAFTA is one of the most significant of all the 
IIAs.  It was signed by the United States, Canada and Mexico to 
promote trade liberalization.  NAFTA contains an explicit national 
security exception under Article 2102.  The provision construed is 
very similar to that of WTO law, GATT Article 10 and GATS Article 
14bis.  It is suggested that “the explicit security provision in NAFTA 
gives parties considerable discretion in defining their national 
security interests.” 89  The terms related to the national security 
                                               
85  Id.; see also Chalamish, supra note 56, at 667 (highlighting how investment 
agreements cover investments by entities without referring specifically to state-
owned entities).   
86  See Christian Tietje, Bilateral Investment Treaties Between EU Member States 
(intra-EU-BITs) – Challenges in the Multilevel System of Law, 10 TRANSNAT’L DISP. 
MGMT. J.. 1 (2013) (discussing the recent progress made in promoting greater trans-
parency in investment law and investment arbitration). 
87  See Julien Chaisse, Exploring the Confines of International Investment and Do-
mestic Health Protections–Is a General Exceptions Clause a Forced Perspective?, 39 AM. J. 
L. & MED. 332 (2013) (analyzing the growth of international law of foreign invest-
ment and its effects on trade between countries and dispute resolution). 
88  See Communication from the Commission to the Council, supra note 78, at 4 (stat-
ing the goal of establishing a “common international investment policy” that fosters 
stability and therefore encourages international investment). 
89  See Rose-Ackerman & Billa, supra note 69, at 470 (claiming that the explicit 
security provision in NAFTA is a “ceiling rather than a floor” and cannot be used 
to manufacture a wider, implicit national security exception). 
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exception under NAFTA – “any actions that it considers necessary 
for the protection of its essential security interests”90 – suggest that 
the exception is “self-judging,”91 especially with the phrase “it 
considers necessary.”  It means that when the host state suspects or 
believes that the foreign investment tends to be a threat to its public 
interest, the government may reject or restrict such an investment 
project under this exception in “good faith.”92  Another provision 
from NAFTA seems to suggest that the national security exception 
is self-judging.  Article 1138 provides that if it is an action to restrict 
investments, the decision by the host party is not subject to any 
dispute settlement provision under the treaty.  Some commented 
that “if the Parties had agreed that Article 2102 were entirely self-
judging, Article 1138 would not be necessary.”93  Therefore, any 
prohibition or restriction imposed on investment-related SWFs 
invoked by the national security exception will be a final decision 
and not subject to dispute settlement provisions under NAFTA.  The 
use of such a treaty is very limited in the context of SWFs.  
The United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) 
is worth studying in the context of SWFs and national security not 
only because Singapore has recently been active in making 
sovereign investments in foreign countries and because it is one of 
the most influential economies in Asia, but also because the form of 
this BIT is quite significant and typical.  Singapore has also invested 
in several major financial institutions in the United States.  The 
typical negative list approach is used under the USSFTA, meaning 
that the non-applicable service sectors are listed in the Annex.94  The 
definition of “investor” is clearly stated in the agreement under 
Article 15.1, which does not exclude a SWF as a type of investor.  The 
most relevant section is Chapter 15 (Investment) in the context of 
SWFs.  Similar to other BITs, the USSFTA also contains provisions 
related to MFN, NT, and the national security exception regarding 
expropriation and compensation etcetera in the said chapter. 
                                               
90  North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2102(b), Dec. 
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
91  See Rose-Ackerman & Billa, supra note 69, at 469 (describing the national 
security exception in NAFTA article 2102, and its similarities to the exception avail-
able in GATT).  
92  Id. 
93  See id. at 470 (providing evidence that NAFTA article 2102 is “not entirely 
self-judging”).  
94  See Hsu, supra note 68, at 460 (showing examples of obligations under the 
investment and financial services chapters of the USSFTA).  
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This raises an issue regarding the national security exception.  
Most of the BITs and FTAs that the United States has entered into 
have been drafted based on the language from the Treaty in 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCNs) or the US Model BIT 
2004.  These two treaties use the phrase “essential security” instead 
of “national security,” as used in the Foreign Investment and 
National Security Act (FINSA), which regulates foreign investments 
in the United States.  The question is whether the BITs or FTAs can 
be relied on when it comes to investment disputes.95  The phrase 
“essential security” used under the USSFTA Article 21.2 is made 
with reference to the GATT Article 10 and GATS Article 14bis.  
However, the ambiguous scope and meaning of this term under 
WTO law, as mentioned above, does not give sufficient assistance in 
interpretation and clarification.  Such reference only cycles the issue 
of uncertainty and lack of certainty of the term back to the original 
starting point.  Another question is about remedies after the 
prohibition or restriction is made against SWFs.96  Some scholars 
have argued that the IIAs focus only on the post-establishment 
remedies.97  This is not realistic enough because SWF investors 
would usually inject large amounts of capital into the host state for 
the establishment before the decision.98  It is uncertain whether this 
will be treated as “expropriation” and what remedies the SWF 
investors, i.e., the governments, will correspondingly receive.  
Sometimes, it appears that IIAs are customized and thus they tend 
to provide more certainty and protection to investors.  However, 
there are still some realistic clarifications required when they refer 
back to an unclear term.  
After the Argentine economic crises in 2002, Argentina was 
involved in a series of lawsuits.  The most significant dispute dealing 
with the national security exception was between Argentina and the 
United States.  Like most recent BITs, the Argentine–US BIT allows 
state–state dispute settlement concerning the national security 
exception. The BIT does contain a security exception provision with 
                                               
95  See id. at 463 (questioning the applicability of the national security exception 
as it relates to BIT or FTA obligations).  
96  See id. at 468 (pointing out the weaker negotiating position of the foreign 
investor in negotiating risk mitigation agreements arising from national security 
concerns).  
97  See Chalamish, supra note 56, at 670 (positing that BITs do not really apply 
to SWFs pre-establishment, but only post-establishment).  
98  See Hsu, supra note 68, at 468 (detailing the national security provisions of 
FINSA 2007). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
   
608 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:2 
the use of the phrase “the protection of its own essential security 
interests.”99  In one of the cases, it was held that major economic 
emergencies are considered to be “essential security interests.”100  
So, prima facie, Argentina could invoke the exception.  However, the 
court continued to express that the article is not self-judging.101  The 
decision clearly shows that the court is reluctant to allow the states 
to determine whether they can invoke the exceptions.102  The 
judgment also provides a framework that when either party would 
like to justify its breach of obligations based on the exception of the 
BIT, one of the parties should show the relationship between the 
measures adopted and the “resolution of the crisis.”103 
The Argentine cases provide directions on how the decision 
would likely be made, and this increases certainty.  The decisions 
give more clarifications on how to interpret the security exception 
provision of a BIT with the key terms being unclear.  The case law 
provided lessons to the states for clearer terms and it has assisted 
the countries in negotiating and concluding new BITs.  After the 
Argentine case, the United States updated its treaty language based 
on the US Model BIT.  The United States has ensured that the 
exception is self-judging so it can be invoked easily.  Therefore, the 
claims actually fill in the existing gap and further help to better the 
investment law and promote sovereign investments. 
 
4.  THE HARD LAW DIMENSION OF THE EU INTERNAL MARKET 
 
The EU law is extraordinary compared to other multilateral 
treaties.  Not only does it cater to the member states but it also helps 
to promote world trade with the EU by extending its protection to 
third countries.104  Another important feature of the EU approach is 
                                               
99  Treaty with Argentina Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Pro-
tection of Investment art. 11, U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-2 
(1993).  
100  CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. The Republic of Argentina, para. 360 – ICSID 
Case ARB/01/8, Award May 12, 2005.  
101  Id.  
102  Rose-Ackerman & Billa, supra note 69, at 469. 
103  Id. at 486. 
104  The Treaty of Rome provided for the free movement of capital, but the 
abolition of capital restrictions between member states was to be ‘to the extent nec-
essary to ensure the proper functioning of the common market.’ Despite initial pro-
gress in the 1960s, there was a lot of later backtracking as many member states in-
troduced safeguard measures. Many financial operations with other member states 
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the application of existing EU laws to SWFs.  It serves as a useful 
reminder that the free movement of capital is a fundamental 
freedom in the European common market, and as such can be 
restricted only in clearly limited cases.105  The scope of these 
restrictions determines the leeway given to member states to 
regulate sovereign investments in their respective territories.106  
Most countries have laws and regulations in place that restrict FDI 
in industries considered sensitive to national security or 
sovereignty.107  Some national regulations give the government a 
right to review proposed foreign investment.  Any national 
legislation that establishes mechanisms to control SWFs is, by its 
very nature, an exception to the principles of free movement of 
capital and freedom of establishment—free movement of capital 
and freedom of establishment being integral features of the EU’s 
approach to SWFs.108 
The Treaty of Functioning of European Union (TFEU), with a 
fundamental principle of the movement of capital, is the focus in the 
                                               
were subject to prior authorization requirements known as “exchange controls.”  
This situation persisted until the early 1990s. Recognizing the damage that this was 
doing to the delivery of a single market, the Council adopted a capital liberalization 
directive, in 1988, providing for the removal of all remaining exchange controls by 
mid-1990 for most of those countries maintaining this mechanism. (Council Di-
rective 88/361/EEC of June 24, 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the 
Treaty, O.J. (L. 178) 5–18. There were, though, transition periods provided for Spain, 
Ireland, Portugal and Greece.). As part of the drive towards Economic and Mone-
tary Union, the freedom of capital movements gained the same status as the other 
Internal Market freedoms with the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty. From 
January 1, 1994 not only were all restrictions on capital movements and payments 
between EU member states prohibited, but so were restrictions between EU mem-
ber states and third countries. In subsequent EU accession rounds, exchange con-
trols have been progressively eliminated in the period before EU membership. In 
general, all capital movements have now been fully liberalized across the EU, alt-
hough some transitional periods have been granted to some newer member states 
for capital operations involving the purchase of real estate (second homes or agri-
cultural land). 
105  See Frank Hoffmeister, Litigating Against the European Union and its Member 
States - Who Responds Under the ILC’s Draft Articles on International Responsibility of 
International Organizations?, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 723 (2010) (discussing the role of the 
EU and its relationship to its member states in the course of their execution of EU 
law); see also Markus Burgstaller, European Law and Investment Treaties, 26 J INT’L 
ARB. 181 (2009) (writing about the growing importance of the changing dynamic 
between investment treaties and European law). 
106  See generally Julien Chaisse, Adapting the European Community Legal Struc-
ture to the International Trade, 17 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1615 (2006). 
107  One example is France. See generally Décret 2005-1739, infra note 230. 
108  See Schweitzer, supra note 30, at 301 (discussing the difficulties of complet-
ing the EU common market principle of freedom of movement of capital). 
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context of SWFs in the EU.  The TFEU Article 64 allows the EU 
member states to adopt measures dealing with foreign investments 
in their territories, including IIAs.  It also extends its benefits to other 
third-party foreign investors.  Out of the two sets of limits provided 
to restrain the members from prohibiting or restricting FDIs, 
derogations pursuant to the TFEU Article 65 deal with the national 
security exception regarding FDIs.  The phrase used is “justified on 
grounds of public policy or public security.”109  Instead of ‘essential 
security’ like NAFTA, which follows the WTO law, the EU law is 
more concerned about “public security” or public order.  In 
addition, this exception is held to be applicable in the situation 
regarding FDIs made by non-member states.110  
 
4.1. The principle of the free movement of capital 
 
The free movement of capital is not absolute. Although a 
fundamental principle of the TFEU, the movement of capital can be 
regulated in two ways at the European level.  According to Article 
64 of the TFEU, the EU may: (1) adopt, by qualified majority, 
“measures on the movement of capital from third countries 
involving direct investment,” and (2) “it is not excluded that the 
Communication can introduce (by a unanimous decision) measures 
that restrict direct investments.”111  Thus, Article 64 of the TFEU 
                                               
109  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 65(1)(b), 2012 O.J. (C 326) at 26 [hereinafter TFEU].  
110  Joined Cases 163/94, 165/94 and 250/94, Sanz de Lera and Others, 1995 
E.C.R. I-4823 [hereinafter Sanz de Lera and Others].  
111  TFEU art. 64, supra note 104, at 72. The terms “direct investment” appeared 
in the Chapter on capital movements and payments of the EC Treaty and now in 
Articles 63–66 of the TFEU. In that context, they have been interpreted by the Court 
of Justice in light of the Nomenclature annexed to Directive 88/361/EEC of June 
24, 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty (1988 O.J. (L. 178).5–18), 
which in turn is largely based on widely accepted definitions of the IMF and the 
OECD. Case C-446/04, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v. Comm’rs of 
Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. I-11869 [hereinafter Test Claimants in the FII Group 
Litigation]. For different contexts in which the Court has recognized the framework 
established in Directive 88/361/EEC as valuable for the implementation of Article 
67, see generally Case C-157/05, Holböck v. Salzburg-Land, 2007 E.C.R. I-4051; Case 
C-112/05, Comm’n v. Germany, 2007 E.C.R I-8995; Case C-101/05, Skatterverket v. 
A, 2007 E.C.R. I-11584; Case C-194/06, Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. Orange Eu-
ropean Smallcap Fund N.V., 2008 E.C.R. I-3819; Case C-274/06, Comm’n v. Spain, 
CURIA (February 14, 2008), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/docu-
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gives the EU the competence to adopt measures with regard to the 
establishment of foreign investors in the EU.  This includes the 
adoption of internal EU legislation and conclusions of IIAs such as 
EU’s FTAs.  Further, because the TFEU explicitly covers relations 
between member states and third party countries, foreign investors 
are able to benefit from important rights vis-à-vis their investments 
in the EU.  Since SWF investments have to be treated in the same 
way as any other FDI, SWFs benefit from the free movement of 
capital.112  There are, however, two sets of limits on the principle of 
free movement of capital: (1) safeguard clauses, and (2) derogations.  
The scope of these limits will determine the room governments have 
to maneuver when attempting to restrict FDI in their territories.  The 
broader these exceptions are, the easier it will be for governments to 
limit SWFs’ access to the Common Market.  The more narrowly 
these limits are conceived, the easier it will be for SWFs to come into 
the EU market. 
Safeguard clauses are contained in Articles 66 and 75 of the 
TFEU. These articles apply only to third countries and are of a 
temporary nature, intended for application in exceptional 
circumstances.113  The derogations are laid down in Article 64 of the 
Lisbon Treaty and Article 65 of the TFEU.114  Article 64 concerns only 
                                               
ment.jsf?text=&docid=71570&pageIn-
dex=0&doclang=ES&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=898306; Case C-
326/07, Comm’n v. Italy, 2009 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 35. 
112  See generally Torrent, supra note 13, at 1378–99.  
113  Source substantiated intent for limited application. 
114  See generally Treaty of Lisbon, infra note 125; see also TFEU, supra note 109, 
at Article 65.  Article 65 states that: 
The provisions of Article 63 shall be without prejudice to the right of Mem-
ber States: 
(a)to apply the relevant provisions of their tax law which distinguish be-
tween taxpayers who are not in the same situation with regard to their 
place of residence or with regard to the place where their capital is in-
vested; 
(b)to take all requisite measures to prevent infringements of national law 
and regulations, in particular in the field of taxation and the prudential 
supervision of financial institutions, or to lay down procedures for the 
declaration of capital movements for purposes of administrative or statis-
tical information, or to take measures which are justified on grounds of 
public policy or public security. 
2. The provisions of this Chapter shall be without prejudice to the applica-
bility of restrictions on the right of establishment which are compatible 
with the Treaties. 
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relations with third countries and covers the movements of capital 
when regarded as particularly sensitive.  These are typically 
movements of capital involving direct investment, the right of 
establishment, the provision of financial services, or even the 
admission of securities to capital markets.  
 
4.2. The exception to the free movement of capital 
 
Article 65 of the TFEU, perhaps the most important article when 
it comes to potential obstacles SWFs face to investment in the EU, 
describes the powers retained by member states.  Specifically, it 
enables member states to restrict the movement of capital to or from 
other member states or third countries when given grounds as a 
matter of ensuring public order or public security.115  
Under Article 65, a member state is entitled to restrict Treaty 
freedoms on the basis of legitimate national security concerns.  Free 
movement of capital, unlike the other freedoms of movement 
                                               
3. The measures and procedures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall 
not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised re-
striction on the free movement of capital and payments as defined in Ar-
ticle 63. 
115  TFEU, supra note 109, at Article 65(1)(b). The ECJ has expanded the dero-
gations possible to the principle of free movement of capital for a number of “public 
interest” reasons. See e.g., Skatteverket v. A., supra note 106 at I-11575 (citing the 
need to guarantee the effectiveness of fiscal supervision); Case C-452/01, Ospelt v. 
Schlössle Weissenberg Familienstiftung, 2003 E.C.R. I-9790 (citing the need to pre-
serve agricultural communities, maintain a distribution of land ownership which 
allows the development of viable farms and sympathetic management of green 
spaces and the stateside, encourage a reasonable use of the available land by resist-
ing pressure on land, and prevent natural disasters);  
Case C-436/00, X & Y v. Riksskatteverket, 2002 E.C.R. I-10864 (citing coherence of 
the tax system, prevention of tax avoidance, effectiveness of fiscal supervision, and 
maintaining for regional planning purposes, a permanent population and an eco-
nomic activity independent of the tourist sector, may be regarded as contributing 
to an objective in the public interest). This finding can only be strengthened by the 
other concerns which may underlie those same measures. For examples of these 
other concerns, see Joined Cases 515, 519, 524, & 526-540/99, Reisch v. Others, 2002 
E.C.R. I-2005 (citing the need to protect the environment); Case C-222/97, Trummer 
& Mayer, 1999 E.C.R. I-1680 (citing the need to ensure that a mortgage system 
clearly and transparently prescribes the respective rights of mortgagees inter se as 
well as the rights of mortgagees as a whole vis-à-vis other creditors); Case C-
302/97, Konle v. Austria, 1999 E.C.R. I-3135 (maintaining, in the general interest, a 
permanent population and an economic activity independent of the tourist sector 
in certain regions); Joined Cases C-282 & 283/04, Comm’n v. Netherlands, 2006 
E.C.R. I-9161 (guaranteeing a universal postal service).  
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established by the TFEU, does not apply solely between member 
states – it prohibits restrictions on the movement of capital between 
member states and third countries.  This is true in respect of all 
investments, be they from SWFs, state-controlled companies, 
private companies or others. 
Furthermore, a number of member states have measures in place 
that, for example, restrict investments in the defense sector.116  In the 
light of the precise and unconditional nature of that Article 65, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) held in Sanz de Lera and Others that 
the codified principle of free movement of capital prohibits both 
restrictions between member states and between member states and 
third countries.117 
The list of justification measures in Article 65(1)(b) TFEU is, 
however, not exhaustive.  Whatever state invokes the coverage of 
Article 65(1)(b) on the grounds of ensuring public order or public 
security, that state must demonstrate that the means it used do not 
go beyond what is necessary to attain the stated end – this essentially 
establishes a proportionality test.  
In Test Claimants in the Franked Investment Income (FII) Group 
Litigation case, the ECJ held that it may be the case that a member 
state will be able to demonstrate that a restriction on capital 
movements to or from third countries is justified for a particular 
reason.  However, this must be in circumstances where that reason 
would not constitute a valid justification for a restriction on capital 
movements between member states.118  To this end, the ECJ adopted 
in Commission vs. Belgium a test which is based on four criteria.  In 
substance, the national measures must first aim at the protection of 
a legitimate general interest, and, secondly, must foresee strict time 
limits for the exercise of opposition rights.  Thirdly, the assets or 
management decisions targeted must be specifically listed, and, 
fourthly, the system’s objective and stable criteria must be subject to 
an effective review by the domestic courts.119  
                                               
116  Several European countries (especially France, Italy, Germany, and Spain) 
actually maintain significant controls on foreign investment, such as overall limits 
on foreign shareholdings or the need for board members to be national citizens. See 
KATINKA BARYSCH & MARINA C. O’DONNELL, FINMECCANICA, SOVEREIGN 
INVESTMENTS IN SENSITIVE SERVICES: THE CASE OF DEFENCE INDUSTRIES 27 (2010) (look-
ing at European countries’ controls and restrictions on investment in defense com-
panies, e.g. France and the UK). 
117  See generally Sanz de Lera and Others, supra note 110. 
118  Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, supra note 111, at I-11753. 
119  Case C-503/99, Comm’n v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I-4809.  
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In analyzing whether such restrictions are justified, different 
considerations may apply than in the case of purely intra-
Community restrictions.120  For example, as of mid-2015 Article 65 
of the TFEU has never been invoked in the context of SWFs.  In other 
words, no member state has ever adopted a law restricting FDI from 
SWFs, nor has a member state ever enforced a decision rejecting an 
SWF investment while arguing the validity of the decision as an 
exception, under Article 65 of the TFEU, to the principal of freedom 
of capital movement under Article 64 of the Treaty of Lisbon.  The 
infrequent use of Article 65 in this manner does not, however, lessen 
the need for a clarification of the scope of Article 65 of the TFEU’s 
two exceptions.  Because no member state has, as of yet, passed 
national-level legislation that would limit the SWFs, it is worthwhile 
ensuring that member states will not be tempted to make extensive 
use of it.  To this end, a short-list of sensitive sectors where 
“enhanced scrutiny” is exercised over inflows of funds could be 
developed, as the French government has done,121 concerning 
whether investment is private or comes from a SWF, subsequently 
cementing free entry to all other sectors.  Such a short-list could take 
the form of a paragraph added to Article 65 of the TFEU. 
 
5.  THE SOFT LAW DIMENSION OF THE EU INTERNAL MARKET 
 
Because of such concerns among EU member states, the main 
European Institutions – the Council, the Commission, and the 
Parliament – decided in 2008 to formulate the basic principles that 
should shape the EU approach to SWFs investments in the internal 
market.  In this respect, a consensus emerged among EU member 
states, electing not to create a new mechanism of control ex nihilo.  
Rather, members chose to rely on existing rules of the Common 
Market that enable member states to derogate from the principle of 
                                               
120  The reason is that the movements of capital to or from third countries take 
place in a different legal context from that which occurs within the Community. 
Particularly, the degree of legal integration that exists between member states of 
the European Union is not comparable to that of economic activities involving re-
lations between member states and third countries. Test Claimants in the FII Group 
Litigation, supra note 111, at I-11831. 
121  For a further discussion on the activities of the French government, see 
discussion infra Section 6.2.  
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freedom of movement of capital.122  In part, the consensus is the 
result of the incapacity of member states and the European 
Institutions to produce a new framework at the supra-national level.  
Confronted with this situation, the EU Institutions demonstrated a 
will to formulate an EU approach, albeit a minimal one, which has 
all the characteristics of a soft law approach.123 
 
5.1. Design and Main Feature of the EU Common Approach  
 
SWF investment raises concerns because it highlights the 
importance of state activity in the global economy, which is 
perceived as detrimental to the role of market forces. SWFs may not 
make investment decisions for economic reasons, but instead may 
choose to invest for political purposes. Further, most countries that 
have set up SWFs are located in the developing world. This may 
ultimately result in a politicization of capital flows vis-à-vis SWFs. 
The range of reasons articulated by host countries for scrutinizing 
SWFs and State-Owned Entities (SOEs) more than private investors 
is indicated as indicated as follows. 
 
Main Reasons to Scrutinize SWFs more than Private Investors 
 
 Fears that countries, as controlling authorities of SWFs, invest in 
companies with a view to acquiring ‘know how’ (e.g., dual-use 
(civil and military) items and technologies; research, produce or 
trade in weapons; intellectual property); 
 Danger of foreign investment in companies that are directly or 
indirectly involved with issues of national security (e.g., wire 
                                               
122  See generally Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO’s 
Supremacy in the International Trade Order: A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of 
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 9 (2013). 
123  For a fascinating, highly theoretical treatment of supranational legal stand-
ards, specifically the context in which commercial norms may self-standardize, see 
Bryan Druzin, Anarchy, Order, and Trade: A Structuralist Account of Why a Global Com-
mercial Legal Order is Emerging, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1049, 1079-80 (2014) (con-
tending that network effect pressures implicit in trade spontaneously stimulate the 
uniformity of legal standards). For earlier work in this vein, see Bryan H. Druzin, 
Buying Commercial Law: Choice of law, Choice of Forum, and Network Effect, 18 TUL. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 131, 149–56 (2009) (arguing that network effects induce standard-
ization in choice of law and choice of forum clauses in transnational commercial 
contracts). 
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tapping and mail interception equipment; cryptology services; 
activities of firms entrusted with national defense secrets);  
 Danger of foreign ‘political’ investments that create 
dependencies (e.g., in the energy sector; water); 
 Lack of transparency in the investment policy of SWFs; 
 The reciprocity issue: How can countries that invest in foreign 
companies via SWFs be prompted to adopt a less restrictive 
policy with regard to foreign investment in their own country 
(e.g., Russia, China and Vietnam)? 
Source:  Author, based on concerns frequently mentioned in the political 
debate 
 
The European concerns about sovereign investments provide 
the background necessary to scrutinize the EU and member state 
reactions. Specifically, concerning EU integration, the most 
important question to ask is whether or not there is a need to 
regulate SWF investment at the international, supra-national (EU), 
or domestic level. And, if so, should legislators proceed through 
hard or soft law? From a substantive law perspective there are 
certain fundamental aspects of SWFs that must be addressed by the 
EU such as transparency, governance, and even SWFs investment 
criteria.  
The proposals and policy initiatives from the stakeholders have 
varied widely – from calls for reciprocity in market access and for 
increased transparency in investment strategies, to full disclosure of 
assets. All these options have their own attendant risks. However, 
they each suffer from the fact that they send “a misleading signal – 
that the EU is stepping back from its commitment to an open 
investment regime. They would also be difficult to reconcile with 
EU law and international obligations.”124  
For instance, Röller and Véron have called for the EU to establish 
a committee on foreign investments that would essentially mirror 
arrangements in the United States.125 They have also called for an 
EU-wide screening mechanism or some “golden shares”126 
                                               
124  See Commission Communication 2008, supra note 16, at § 4.1. 
125  See Röller & Vérnon, supra note 14, at 7-8.  
126  These are non-standard shares, the ownership of which confers special 
rights on the holder. Recent landmark decisions of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) regarding compatibility of ‘golden shares’ with EC law are a clear indication 
that the concept of ‘golden shares’ violates one of the four fundamental freedoms 
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mechanism for non-EU foreign investment.127 Röller and Vérnon 
argue that the EU should draw up legislation to regulate SWFs and 
other investment vehicles from emerging economies not classified 
as ‘free’ by Freedom House.128 Such a mechanism is not anticipated at 
the EU supra-national level because member states wish to retain their 
power to screen foreign investments129. This state of affairs may, however, 
change in the coming years when the Treaty of Lisbon130 extends the 
scope of external trade policy to issues of investment. The 
implications of these essential innovations in EU international 
                                               
conferred on individuals by the EU Treaty, namely the free movement of capital. 
The ECJ has held that an actual exercise of any rights attached to a ‘golden share’ 
by any public body must be based on criteria of non-discrimination and an effective 
legal remedy must be guaranteed. However, the ECJ’s jurisprudence on golden 
shares does not present a straightforward prohibition of them.  Instead, they set out 
strong limits on the use of golden shares. For consideration of golden shares under 
Belgian law, see Case C-503/99, Comm’n v. Belgium, 2002 O.J. (C 169) 4. For a judg-
ment concerning golden shares under Portuguese law, see Case C-367/98, Comm’n 
v. Portugal, 2002 O.J. (C 169) 1 (in the view of the Court, Portugal could not plead 
any permissible ground for justification so the ECJ denied the justification in this 
case). For a judgment concerning golden shares under French law, see Case C-
483/99, Comm’n v. France, 2002 O.J. (C 169) 3 (ECJ was confronted with a decree 
that allowed the French state, by means of a golden share, to secure influence over 
the Société nationale Elf-Aquitaine in such a manner as to require prior approval from 
the minister for economic affairs when a person’s ownership in a company, acting 
alone or in conjunction with others, exceeded certain percentages of the total capital 
or voting rights of that company. As these gave too great a discretion to the decision 
makers, given the lack of sufficiently precise and objective criteria for authorization 
and consent, the ECJ rejected the justification both with regard to the prior author-
ization for certain stock acquisitions exceeding the ceilings and the right to oppose 
the transfer of certain assets or their use as security). See most recently Case C-
543/08, Comm’n v. Portugal (Energias de Portugal), 2010 O.J. (C 13)3 (providing 
judgment that Portugal’s holding of golden shares in Energias de Portugal is con-
trary to EU law). See also Case C-98/01, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 2003 O.J. (C-
158) 4 (providing judgment concerning golden shares under English law); Case C-
174/04, Comm’n v. Italy, 2005 O.J. (C 205) 4; Case C-284/04, Comm’n v. The Neth-
erlands, 2006 O.J. (C 294) 6. For commentary, see Case C-463/00, In re Golden Shares 
IV (Comm’n v. Spain), 2003 E.C.R. I-4581 (Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Advocate Gen.) 
(stating that share capital constitutes a restriction on the free movement of capital 
except if those restrictions can be justified). See generally Larry Catá Backer, The Pri-
vate Law of Public Law: Public Authorities as Shareholders, Golden Shares, Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, and the Public Law Element in Private Choice of Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1801 
(2008).  
127  See Röller & Vérnon, supra note 14, at 5. 
128  Id. at 2 and 5. 
129  See Frederic V. D. Berghe, The EC’s Common Commercial Policy Revisited: 
What Does Lisbon Add, 4 GLOBAL TRADE & CUST. J. 277 (2009).  
130  Treaty of Lisbon: Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Communities, December 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 
[hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon] (came into force on December 1, 2009). 
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treaty-making powers, both on the international stage and in EU 
bilateral relations, might be significant and raise the question as to 
whether or not a US-style Committee on Foreign Investment 
(CFIUS) should be established in the EU.131 
There is a clear consensus among the EU Institutions concerning 
the adoption of a common approach. The Commission took the 
initiative in a communication released in February 2008, which was 
supported by the European Council and the European Parliament 
in March 2008.132 This will be briefly described in the following 
paragraph. The substance of the EU approach will be discussed in 
the subsequent parts of this article. 
The United States and the EU first discussed the question of 
SWFs at the meeting of the Transatlantic Economic Council held in 
Washington on November 9, 2007. At this meeting, both parties 
agreed to formally launch an Investment Dialogue to promote open 
investment regimes globally.133 In February 2008, the Commission 
presented a communication, titled A Common European Approach to 
Sovereign Wealth Funds.134 According to this 2008 Communication, 
new legislative measures at the Community level are unnecessary. 
The Commission recommended a common approach premised 
on five key principles: (1) commitment to an open investment 
environment; (2) support of multilateral work; (3) use of existing 
instruments; (4) respect of EC Treaty (ECT) obligations and 
international commitments; and (5) proportionality and 
transparency. Further, the Commission set out some of the options 
vis-à-vis regulating SWF operations within the EU common market. 
The strategies, data, and general information that funds agree to 
make available tend to differ enormously both in terms of scope and 
quality. These differences exacerbate the fear that SWF investment 
                                               
131  Such an interesting research question would however raise a host of other 
issues, such as: Which EU institutions should be involved in the screening mecha-
nism? Should the EU’s highest authority in charge of rejecting FDI be the EU Coun-
cil (subject to unanimity)? Should there be cooperation with National governments? 
Which intelligence services in the EU would be capable of alerting EU Institutions? 
132  Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council ¶¶ 30–36 (March 13–
14, 2008) [hereinafter Presidency Conclusions]. 
133  As per the Report: “We note the growth of investments by government-
controlled investors such as sovereign wealth funds. We welcome commercially-
driven investment from these investors and note the importance of transparent in-
vestment policies.” US–EU Summit, June 10, 2008, Brdo, Slovn., Transatlantic Eco-
nomic Council Report to the E.U.-U.S. Summit 2008, available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/06/20080610-4.html. 
134  Commission Communication 2008, supra note 16. Note that Commission 
Communications to other EU Institutions are not legally binding. 
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could give foreign governments’ excessive political influence over 
domestically active firms. Alternatively, if SWFs are transparent and 
comply with clear rules of accountability, then the mere fact of state-
ownership should not give cause for concern. The Commission’s 
communication advocates a common European approach based on 
cooperation between the countries hosting the SWFs, the funds 
themselves, and those responsible for them, all with a view to 
establishing “a set of principles ensuring the transparency, 
predictability and accountability of SWFs investments.”135 Further, 
all investors in the market should have to observe the same set of 
regulations that cover competition, the internal market, and 
employment law.136 In addition, the various instruments that control 
foreign investments that the member states adopt in order to protect 
public security, law, and order must not conflict with EU primary 
law and directives. Further, the ECJ shall ultimately be the body 
tasked with scrutinizing conformity with the aforementioned 
principle.137 
By issuing the 2008 Communication, the Commission sought to 
avoid legislative action. Instead, it strove for soft measures – such as 
guidelines – accompanied by efforts at the international level to 
increase the transparency of SWFs. Since the Global Financial Crisis, 
there has been an increased need to attract liquidity to both Europe 
and the United States. In this regard, regulation is hardly the best 
response, as few requirements could be usefully imposed on SWFs. 
The EU has traditionally been an open investment environment that 
promotes a Common Market. The fundamental principle of free 
movement of capital, a cornerstone of the Common Market, was 
codified in the Treaty on European Union, popularly known as the 
Maastricht Treaty.138 The basic tenet of this central principle is that 
companies that are authorized to conduct activities in one of the 
member countries (the state of origin)139 must be able to sell their 
services or establish branches throughout the EU – thereby ensuring 
a common and accessible market. It is also important to note that the 
                                               
135  Id. at § 4.1. 
136  Id. 
137  Id. at § 3.1. 
138  Treaty on European Union, February 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1. The full liber-
alization of capital movements in the EU was initially established in the Council 
Directive 88/361, 1988 O.J. (L. 178) 5–18. 
139  For the scope and definition of the state of origin principle, see Armin Hatie, 
Services Directive—A Legal Analysis, 6 EUR. COMMUNITY STUD. ASSOC. AUS. PUB SERIES 
1 (discussing the challenge of identifying the state of origin). 
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2008 Communication suggests that the common European approach 
is intended to merely complement the regulatory regimes adopted 
by member states governing transactions in their particular 
jurisdictions. 
On March 4, 2008, the Council of the EU140 held an exchange of 
views on issues relating to SWFs,141 with the purpose of furthering 
the discussion by the European Council142 at its spring meeting 
(March 13–14, 2008).  The delegates agreed on the need for the EU to 
form a common position, as a means of ensuring that their shared 
objectives are met through the work of international fora. They 
further agreed that commitments by SWFs, in particular with regard 
to the separation of the management of SWFs from political 
authorities, should be central to any agreement at the global level. 
Ultimately, they determined that if international negotiations did 
not develop satisfactorily, further action should be considered at the 
EU level. 
The European Council adopted the ideas set out by the 
Commission, clarifying two of the five principles encapsulated in 
the 2008 Communication. The Council’s position differed in that, 
rather than expressing its support for the multilateral approach in 
general, it commented specifically on the work underway in the IMF 
and the OECD. Further, rather than referring to the use of the 
existing instruments, and once again taking a more general 
approach, the European Council thought it more appropriate to 
adopt use of national instruments and EU instruments. 
At the Spring Summit on March 13 and 14, 2008, the European 
Council welcomed the Commission’s communications on SWFs.143 
While taking into account national prerogatives, the European 
Council agreed on the need for a common European approach in 
line with the five principles proposed by the Commission, namely: 
(1) commitment to an open investment environment; (2) support for 
ongoing work in the IMF and the OECD; (3) use of national and EU 
                                               
140  The Council of the EU (also known as the Council of Ministers) is the EU’s 
main decision-making body and has legislative power, which it shares with the Eu-
ropean Parliament. 
141  Council of the European Union, Economic and Financial Affairs, 2857th 
Council meeting, 7192/08, March 4, 2008. 
142  The European Council is the supreme body of the European Union, the 
highest political representatives (Prime Ministers or Presidents) from all member 
states attend the Council’s meetings. The European Council is responsible for de-
fining the general political direction and priorities of the Union. 
143  Presidency Conclusions, supra note 132. 
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instruments if necessary; (4) respect for EC Treaty obligations and 
international commitments; and (5) proportionality and 
transparency. The European Council supported the objective of 
forming a consensus at the international level on a voluntary Code 
of Conduct for SWFs and defining principles for the recipient 
countries. In this respect, they reiterated the EU’s “support for [the] 
ongoing work in the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the 
OECD”.144 There was a clear rejection of a Europe-wide screening 
mechanism that would echo the system in the United States. 
With the aim of providing coordinated input to this ongoing 
debate, the European Council invited145 the Commission and the 
Council of the EU to continue their work along these lines, stressing 
the importance of a common EU approach to SWFs during debate at 
the international level. However, the European Council also 
strongly insisted that governments should be allowed to “make use 
of national and EU instruments if necessary” to counter foreign 
investments not justified for commercial reasons.146  
The European Parliament (EP) welcomed the 2008 
Communication. The EP expressed its concern that: 
[T]he lack of transparency of certain SWFs may not allow an  
accurate understanding of their structure and motivation 
requests the Commission to acknowledge the fact that 
transparency and disclosure are the key principle for the 
establishment of a truly level playing field and the smooth 
running of markets in general.147  
Somewhat earlier in the year, the EP had stated that the FTA, 
with the Gulf Cooperation Council, should seek to “promote 
increased transparency and accountability with regard to 
investments made by sovereign wealth funds”.148  
Likewise, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) 
added its support for the European Commission’s proposal. The 
EESC underscored that “the Commission should work together 
with the Member States and the supervisory authorities to improve 
                                               
144  Id. at ¶ 36. 
145  Id. 
146  Id. 
147  Resolution on Sovereign Wealth Funds, EUR. PARL. DOC.NO. P6_TA-
PROV(2008)0355 (2008)  at ¶E (translation from French). 
148  Resolution on the Free Trade Agreement between the European Commu-
nity and the Gulf Cooperation Council, EUR. PARL. DOC. NO. P6_TA(2008)0355 
(2008), at ¶ E12. 
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the transparency of these funds, understand their motives, and 
make sure they are not pursuing political objectives”.149 Prior to 
2008, the EESC had noted that generally it “would urge the 
Commission to present, as soon as possible, its draft legislative 
provisions aimed at stepping up the information provided by 
institutional investors with regard to their policies in respect of 
investment and voting”.150 
5.2. The EU’s Support for a Multilateral Regulation 
The first important feature of the EU approach towards SWFs is 
its support for multilateral solutions. This approach has been 
accepted and supported by all EU Institutions. Because SWFs are 
conceptualized as a global phenomenon rather than simply an intra-
national one, the EU perspective is that binding regulation needs to 
happen at a level above the EU itself. Given SWFs’ international 
scope, the EU cooperates with other hosts on the one hand, and with 
SWFs and those responsible for them on the other. The European 
approach – the proposal encapsulated in the 2008 Communication 
and supported by all the other European Institutions – 
acknowledges this analysis and is well in-line with the EU’s 
historical preference for multilateral bodies having a unilateral 
approach. Ultimately, the analytical inroad taken by the EU is 
important because it provides support for the work by the IMF and 
the OECD. 
Unilateral action by the EU could be disastrous for many 
reasons. Obviously, it can be seen as, or even strategically argued 
that it is, necessarily, a protectionist policy. Further, unilateral 
actions have the potential to proliferate, contributing to the creation 
of a multitude of irreconcilable standards across jurisdictions. This 
could impose undue compliance costs on SWFs, which would in 
turn affect the efficient flow of capital.  
For the aforementioned reasons, some argue that it not 
opportune to adopt a narrow European approach. Rather, the 2008 
Communication seeks an international and global solution. The EU 
is thus playing an active role in ensuring that the work of the 
                                               
149  Opinion of the Section for Economic and Monetary Union and Social Co-
hesion, European and Social Committee, on ‘Financial Integration: The Case of Eu-
ropean Stock Markets’, CESE 283/2008 ¶ 1.5, available at http://www.eesc.eu-
ropa.eu/?i=portal.en.eco-opinions.14069. 
150  Opinion of the Section for Single Market, Production and Consumption, 
European Economic and Social Committee, on ‘Review of the Single Market’ ¶ 
1.1.15, 2007 O.J. (C 93). 
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multilateral bodies moves forward. The Commission strives 
towards finding a code of conduct that would be developed at the 
global level both by the host countries and the SWFs themselves. A 
voluntary code of conduct that enshrines basic standards for 
governance and transparency would ensure greater clarity in the 
functioning of SWFs. The 2008 Communication clearly recognizes 
the import of “obtain[ing] greater clarity and insight into the 
governance of SWFs . . . . [and] deliver[ing] greater transparency on 
their activities and investments”.151  
In October 2007, the G7 Finance Ministers made a call for major 
multilateral organizations to reflect upon the growing role of SWFs 
and regulatory issues. The G7 specifically mentioned the IMF and 
the OECD.152 Since March 2008, when the Council signaled its 
support for this approach, the Commission has been actively 
involved in the work of the IMF and the OECD concerning the 
establishment of SWF best practices.153 Since the G7 summit, the 
activities of the IMF and the OECD have run parallel and, while they 
are not dealing with exactly the same themes, they are generally 
complementary. The OECD Working Group’s efforts have 
complemented the above – they have attempted to determine how 
host countries should respond to the SWFs investments. It has more 
or less determined that most host countries want to identify the best 
practice with respect to SWF investment frameworks, building on 
                                               
151  Commission Communication 2008, supra note 16, at § 4.3. 
152  Statement of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank of Governors, Wash-
ington, D.C. (October 19, 2007), available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/fi-
nance/fm071019.htm. In the statement, the G7/8 Finance Ministers noted that: 
Cross-border, market-based investment is a major contributor to robust 
global growth. In this context, we agreed that sovereign wealth funds 
(SWFs) are increasingly important participants in the international finan-
cial system and that our economies can benefit from openness to SWF in-
vestment flows. We see merit in identifying best practices for SWFs in such 
areas as institutional structure, risk management, transparency and ac-
countability. For recipients of government-controlled investments, we 
think it is important to build on principles such as nondiscrimination, 
transparency, and predictability . . . . We ask the IMF, World Bank, and 
OECD to examine these issues. 
153  Since 1960, the Commission of the European Community has had quasi-
member status with the OECD. The members of the EC delegation thus sit in on the 
OECD’s various specialized committees that monitor the work of the Secretariat. 
Further, the signatory states decided that the Commission of the European Com-
munity “shall take part in the work” of the OECD. OECD, Convention on the 
OECD, December 14, 1960. 
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the key principles of non-discrimination, accountability, 
transparency, and predictability.154  
At the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting in Paris, the Ministers 
adopted the OECD’s Declaration on SWFs and Recipient State 
Policies. The Declaration reiterated, “SWFs have become a key player 
in the new financial”.155 The Ministers formally recognized the 
financial benefits that SWFs bring to the home and the host 
economies. Such a statement clearly implies that protectionist 
barriers to foreign investments, be they from SWFs or otherwise, 
would hamper the growth which is vital to many economies. They 
underscored the value of the Investment Committee report on 
SWFs, which should guide the investment policies of recipient 
countries with a view to preserve and even expand an environment 
for SWFs that is as open as possible, while protecting national 
security interests.  
The OECD’s Declaration on Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient 
State Policies was published in October 2008.156 These guidelines 
draw on the OECD’s extensive work on the treatment of foreign 
investment in the OECD economies. OECD work also draws on the 
2005 OECD Guidelines for Corporate Governance of State Owned 
Enterprises.157 The OECD guidance on host state policies regulating 
SWFs plays a pivotal role in shaping the fundamental principle of 
non-discrimination. Ultimately, governments should be guided by 
the principle of non-discrimination when making decisions on SWF 
investment, as well as by the principles of transparency, regulatory 
proportionality, and accountability.  
Another important issue is that of investment reciprocity. 
Currently, there are concerns about both the quantity and quality of 
restrictions on investments which EU firms may face when they 
want to invest abroad, such as in China or Russia. This ultimately 
poses the question: How can countries that invest in foreign 
companies via SWFs be moved to adopt less restrictive policies 
                                               
154  For dissection of the work of the OECD, see Edwin M. Truman, OECD Guid-
ance on Sovereign Wealth Funds: Still Falling Short (2008), available at 
http://www.piie.com/realtime/?p=189 (praising the OECD for their improved 
treatment of SWFs but expressing continuing disappointment that they did not 
“move further to strengthen the openness of their investment regimes”). 
155  OECD, DECLARATION ON SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND RECIPIENT STATE 
POLICIES 1 (2008) [hereinafter GUIDELINES 2008]. 
156  Id. 
157  OECD, GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE OWNED 
ENTERPRISES 1 (2005) [hereinafter GUIDELINES 2005], available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/51/34803211.pdf.  
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concerning foreign investment in their own countries? 
Luxembourg’s Finance Minister Jean-Claude Juncker has led the 
charge in the EU, clearly tying his resistance to SWFs from Russia to 
fears concerning investment reciprocity. Juncker has stated that it is 
unacceptable for the Russian government’s fund to be welcomed in 
the Common Market while European companies are unable to 
undertake similar activities in Russia.158 Further, Juncker has argued 
that the EU should respect the principle of reciprocity and that it 
would be dangerous to leave everything up to the market.159 He has 
gone on to say that it is necessary to take strong political action to 
strengthen surveillance and to ensure transparency in financial 
markets.160  
Some countries that sponsor SWFs impose severe restrictions on 
Inward Foreign Direct investment (IFDI) by individuals and firms 
from the EU and other OECD countries such as Russia and China. 
Ultimately, the prerogative of SWFs to invest a large portion of their 
assets in the EU creates an opportunity to press restrictive home 
countries to open up their respective economies to inward foreign 
investment. Currently, the EU wants to ensure that there is a level 
playing field across every aspect of economic cooperation – with 
particular attention to the energy sector as a prime area of 
cooperation between the EU and Russia. Whereas Russia wants each 
sphere to be treated separately in terms of volumes of 
investments.161  
Furthermore, both the European Commission and the European 
Council have stressed the necessity of guaranteeing independence 
of management, as well as transparency of both ownership structure 
and the interests of SWFs.162 Discussions about SWFs and their 
investments in the EU can potentially create leverage to limit 
Russian investments in the EU if the EU’s views on reciprocity are 
not taken into account. Because many SWFs are located in countries 
                                               
158  Robert Amsterdam, Europe Wary of Russia’s Sovereign Wealth (2008) (quot-
ing Juncker), available at http://robertamsterdam.com/2008/02/eu-
rope_wary_of_russias_sovereign_wealth_funds/. 
159  Id. 
160  Id. 
161  Edwin M. Truman et al., SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: THREAT OR SALVATION 
67 (2010). 
162  See Commission Communication 2008, supra note 16 (outlining the EU ap-
proach to SWFs and its attempt to encourage them while managing the concerns 
they raise); see also Council of the European Union, Economic and Financial Affairs, 
2857th Council meeting, 7192/08, March 4, 2008 (stating the EU’s desire to establish 
a common approach to SWFs and their intention to do so at a later meeting). 
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that are financially less open to foreign investment than typical 
OECD countries, the immediate effect of a strict application of the 
reciprocity principle could be to place strong limitations on some 
SWFs’ investment. 
During OECD discussions on SWFs, the European Commission 
did not offer any proposals speaking to its previously discussed 
interest in reciprocity. One reason why the EC did not include any 
proposals addressing reciprocity is perhaps linked to the fact that 
the EU is the biggest international investor.163 Thus, there would be 
no significant gain for EU investors as they already seem to have 
secured adequate access to foreign markets. Further, the reciprocity 
requirement could potentially be interpreted as negative – demands 
for reciprocity could potentially be perceived as an excuse for 
engaging in protectionism. Restricting investment risks retribution 
from countries with SWFs – this includes Russia and China, where 
European companies are active. Further, avoiding reciprocity has 
been an important OECD policy prerogative – as a result, OECD 
guidance on host state policies covering SWF investment does not 
include any demand for reciprocity.164 
The European Community is not a member of the IMF. However 
“the creation of the euro [(€)] gave a strong impetus to” 165 
coordinate policy with the IMF. Thus, EU member states have “set 
up a multi-layered structure of coordination, composed of a 
Brussels-based committee” 166 and an informal group of member 
states’ officials who meet in Washington, D.C.167 This system, driven 
by the United States and the EU, strives to draw up a code of best 
practice that includes a renunciation of political motives; however, 
it has stirred resentment among some countries with SWFs, 
                                               
163  By 2014, the EU’s outward FDI totaled US$ 3.88 trillion, down from US$ 
9.15 trillion, while EU inward FDI amounted to US$ 3.6 trillion, down from US$ 
5.36 trillion. See most recent data from UNCTAD data July 2015, available at 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/. 
164  The OECD instruments are based on the philosophy that liberalization is 
beneficial to all, especially countries that undergo liberalization. E.g., GUIDELINES 
2008, supra note 155.   
165  ADS INSIGHT, EUROPEAN COORDINATION AT THE WORLD BANK AND 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: A QUESTION OF HARMONY? 8 (2006), available at 
http://www.eurodad.org/uploadedfiles/whats_new/reports/euro-
dad%20euifigovernance.pdf. 
166  Id. 
167  Id. 
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particularly in China and some Gulf countries.168 This code was 
criticized at the 2008 World Economic Forum, where representatives 
of some of the Gulf funds deemed it both unnecessary and intrusive, 
as “the investment funds had never done anything to arouse 
suspicion”.169  Similarly, “Chinese officials have also been quoted as 
saying that the best practice idea [is] unnecessary”.170   
The IMF’s challenge from the onset has been to find the best way 
to advance calls for increased SWF disclosure. This concern has 
gained traction in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. The IMF 
has, inter alia, wrestled with determining the best way of addressing 
calls for increased SWF disclosure. This issue cannot simply be 
framed as a threat to withdraw the privilege of investing in Western 
markets. Ultimately, many countries with large SWFs are tired of 
being lectured to. Further, given global imbalances and the funding 
needs of a capitalist economic system, such threats are likely to be 
ineffective. In the same vein, the International Working Group of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) has had to overcome objections by 
members that articulate the fear that the adoption of any set of 
principles will in effect validate overarching concerns vis-à-vis the 
activities of SWFs. Ultimately, SWFs have been reluctant to adopt 
practices that put them at a comparative disadvantage with other 
investors, particularly concerning the confidentiality of their 
investments.171    
In October 2008, despite the difficulties described above, the IMF 
issued a set of twenty-four voluntary principles, popularly known 
as the Santiago Principles, for SWFs to follow. These Principles 
                                               
168  See Suwaidi Critical of IMF Attempt to Monitor SWF Investments in West, 
EMIRATES 24/7, May 9, 2008, available at http://www.emirates247.com/2.291/su-
waidi-critical-of-imf-attempt-to-monitor-swf-investments-in-west-2008-05-09-
1.226998. (reporting that “[t]he UAE [United Arab Emirates] has criticized the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) for its decision to interfere in the activities of the 
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), branding it a politically motivated move. Central 
Bank Governor Sultan bin Nassir Al Suwaidi said the IMF lacks sufficient experi-
ence in such issues and its involvement following Western pressure could discour-
age further SWF investment in the United States . . . .  Al Suwaidi’s address was on 
behalf of the UAE and other Arab central bank governors representing their coun-
tries at the meeting. The states he represented included Bahrain, Egypt, Qatar, Jor-
dan, Kuwait, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Syria, and Yemen.”). 
169  Steven R. Weisman, Government Funds Promise to Avoid ‘Geopolitical Goals’, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2008., available at http://www.ny-
times.com/2008/03/21/business/worldbusiness/21iht-sover-
eign.1.11312313.html. 
170  Id. 
171  Mehmet Caner & Thomas J. Grennes, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Norwe-
gian Experience, 33 THE WORLD ECON. 597 (2010) [hereinafter Caner & Grennes]. 
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address some of the concerns raised by host countries while 
ensuring SWFs’ competitiveness in global financial markets.172 The 
Santiago Principles encourage SWFs to explain their investment 
criteria173 as well as recommend that host countries set-up 
investment policies for the SWFs, so that they can avoid buying 
stakes in sensitive companies,174 such as Western defense 
contractors. At the same time that the IMF approved the Santiago 
Principles, the IWG also voted to create a standing committee 
charged with updating the Santiago Principles over time as well as 
liaising with Western governments and institutions, such as the 
World Bank and IMF, on issues of concern.175 The Santiago Principles 
make repeated reference to the need for greater transparency.176 The 
Principles include recommendations that sovereign funds coordinate 
their activities with their respective governments and central banks 
to avoid interfering with domestic economic policy.177 Further, they 
urge SWFs to disclose their sources of funding as well as the 
conditions under which their controlling authorities can withdraw 
the committed funds.178 They also urge SWFs to ensure that SWF 
managers are independent of the fund-controlling authorities, but 
fully accountable, e.g., that they publish annual reports and undergo 
annual audits.179 
Throughout the IMF negotiations the EU’s position mainly 
covered issues of transparency and governance. As reported by the 
European Commission, “[s]ince SWFs are managed independently 
                                               
172  INT’L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH 
FUNDS GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES: “SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES” 3 
(2008), available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf 
[hereinafter SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES]. 
173  Id. at 4, 22-23 (explaining Principle 21 and the purpose of the GAPP [Gen-
erally Accepted Principles and Practices]). 
174  Id. at 20, (Principle 18 explains that the investment policy should give guid-
ance on the SWF’s risk tolerance by covering topics such as: permissible asset clas-
ses, investment parameters, “concentration risk with regard to individual holdings, 
liquidity, and geographical and sectoral concentration”, and strategic asset alloca-
tion). 
175  IMF, International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds Presents the "San-
tiago Principles" to the International Monetary and Financial Committee, Press Release 
No. 08/06, Washington, D.C., October 11, 2008. 
176  See, e.g., SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 172 (referencing the need for 
greater transparency 14 times in total). 
177  SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 172, at 11 (Section A: Legal Framework, 
Objectives and Coordination with Macroeconomic Policies). 
178  Id. at 13 (Principle 4). 
179  Id. at 16 (Principle 9). 
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from a state’s foreign exchange reserves, they are excluded from 
transparency mechanisms such as the IMF maintains for foreign 
exchange reserves . . . .”180 However, looking at the available data on 
SWFs, an SWF’s general lack of transparency has some correlation 
with whether the government controlling the fund is democratic or 
autocratic.181 Democratic governments typically have to meet, in 
their governance and in their institutions, transparency standards 
that dictatorships do not. But because a fair number of countries 
with SWFs can be considered ‘non-democratic,’ SWFs’ general lack 
of transparency makes host countries fear that non-commercial 
strategic, political, and social factors may overwhelmingly inform 
their investment decisions. Transparency, as stipulated by the 
Commission, can be understood as a requirement for the publication 
of statistics and data as follows. 
 
Transparency as Suggested by the EU Approach 
 Transparency practices that could be considered would include: 
o Annual disclosure of investment positions and asset 
allocation, in particular for investments for which there is 
majority ownership; 
o Exercise of ownership rights; 
o Disclosure of the use of leverage and of the currency 
composition; 
o Size and source of an entity’s resources; 
o Disclosure of the home state regulation and oversight 
governing the SWF. 
Source: Author’s elaboration on principles and policies encapsulated by the 
2008 Communication, supra note 1. 
 
The Santiago Principles have been taken into account very 
seriously by the EU.  Notably, the EU-Singapore FTA gives special 
attention to SWFs, which are included in the Institutional, General 
and Final Provisions Chapters.  Article 17.8 of the FTA indicates 
"[e]ach Party shall encourage its sovereign wealth funds to respect 
the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices – Santiago 
                                               
180  Commission Communication 2008, supra note 16, at 10. 
181  Sovereign Wealth Funds, Foreign Policy Consequences in an Era of New Money: 
Hearing Before S. Foreign Relations Comm., 110th Cong. 9–10 (2008), (prepared state-
ment of Jagdish Bhagwati, Senior Fellow, Int’l Economics, Council on Foreign Re-
lations). 
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Principles."182  This is important, as the soft law rules developed by 
the IMF are now incorporated in a binding treaty signed by the EU 
and may further encourage parties to respect the international 
guidelines. 
More generally, the criteria mentioned in the EU approach are 
fundamental because they could serve to effectively reinforce the 
transparency requirement. The Singaporean SWFs, Temasek, and 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) were the 
first SWFs set up by national governments and both are notorious 
for their lack of transparency.183 Their main purpose was to recycle 
Singapore foreign reserves through state investment vehicles with a 
goal of underpinning an overall vision of national economic 
development.184 Temasek in particular has been exporting this 
strategic investment approach overseas; the Singaporean approach 
has been a major influence on China’s emerging overseas 
investment strategy.185  
It is tempting to also refer to successful models that have proved 
to be even more transparent. One such example is the Norwegian 
Pension Fund (NPF), which is often held up as the benchmark for 
higher transparency and governance. Information on its global 
performance and risk exposure is reported quarterly and its 
holdings in approximately 3,500 companies are detailed 
annually186— in most cases, its investment in any one company 
amounts to less than 1% of available shares.187 The NPF does not 
seek to control companies through buy-outs. By its own rules the 
fund restricts its ownership in any company it invests in by limiting 
                                               
182  European Commission, EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (June 29, 
2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961.  
183  Id. at 10. 
184  Garry Rodan et al., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA: AN 
INTRODUCTION 1 (2006). 
185  See, e.g., John Burton, Singapore’s Wealth Fund Flattered by Imitation, FIN. 
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0a50515c-5b4b-
11dc-8c32-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3pYLhsCf6. 
186  Norwegian Pension Fund Public reporting obligations are detailed in Gov-
ernment Pension Fund Act (no. 123 of December 21, 2005). The Act is further de-
tailed by supplementary provisions on the management of the Government Pen-
sion Fund, especially Section 7-1: Public reports on the management of the Fund 
available at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-govern-
ment-pension-fund/the-guidelines-for-the-management-of-the.html?id=434605#7 
(last visited Jan. 1, 2011).   
187  Norwegian Ministry of Finance, The Management of the Government Pen-
sion Fund in 2010, at 10 and 38 available at http://www.regjeringen.no/Up-
load/FIN/Statens%20pensjonsfond/2011/NBIM_2010_eng.pdf. 
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the acquisition of any rights to 10% of the outstanding shares.188 
Thus, the NPF’s investment objectives are purely financial in nature 
and focused on safeguarding assets for the long term.189  
Another prime example is the Irish National Pension Reserve 
Fund (INPRF), which publishes its investment strategy in an annual 
report.190 Although relatively modest, as of mid-2015 it has assets 
totaling approximately USD 20.8 billion, the INPRF publishes its 
investment strategy every quarter. These quarterly publications 
detail its investment conduits and agents, as well as an audited 
annual report of its holdings in every company. Commitment to 
publications such as these is fundamental to any measure of 
transparency; it ensures that both the information regarding the 
shares which a fund holds as well as the strategy which the fund 
employs is readily available. 
However, beyond requirements of transparency, issues 
concerning the nature of state influence on SWFs are bound to 
surface. For example, a powerful state may establish a degree of 
order in business and state affairs. In such a case, a formal 
requirement of transparency will lead to actual transparency. 
However, this situation is different in Middle Eastern countries191 
and in Russia192 where the states are perhaps not capable of 
guaranteeing that there will be no problems, notably because of the 
limits of the rule of law.  
In any case, transparency cannot be unilateral—the ideal 
equation requires a bilateral process. For SWFs themselves, clarity 
                                               
188  The Ministry of Finance decided to increase the limit on ownership stakes 
from the initial 5% to 10%, but that does not alter the NPFP’s role as a financial 
investor. Indeed, on average in 2010, the Fund owned considerably less than 1% of 
each company in the portfolio. Id.  
189  See generally Caner & Grennes, supra note 171.  
190  For annual reports on the Irish National Pension Reserve Fund see ANNUAL 
REPORTS, IRISH NAT’L PENSION RESERVE FUND 1, available at http://www.nprf/Publi-
cations/annualReports.htm (last visited July 28, 2015). 
191  See Eugene Cotran et al., THE RULE OF LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE 
ISLAMIC WORLD: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (2000) (explaining 
that the rule of law is still at an embryonic stage in the Middle East and that the 
2011 upheaval sweeping the Middle East was driven by the people’s demand for a 
voice in the decisions that affect their lives and for a society that abides by the rule 
of law). 
192  The issue in Russia is not the existence of the laws, which actually are nu-
merous and well drafted, but rather the need to improve judicial institutions (lack 
of respect for courts decisions, subsequent shortcomings in implementing laws, and 
corruption). See generally Jeffrey Kahn, The Search for the Rule of Law in Russia, 37 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 353 (2006). 
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will mean stability and will reduce the risk of serious setbacks. For 
those national economies in which the SWFs are investing, a stable, 
predictable, and non-discriminatory framework will eliminate the 
risk of important investors voting with their feet—in other words, 
leaving Europe and investing elsewhere. The EU approach could 
further gain in popularity if it is revised to place a greater emphasis 
on the reasons undergirding the need for transparency. 
In terms of governance, some international standards already 
exist. For example, the IMF’s Guidelines for Foreign Exchange 
Reserve Management lay down important principles that could be 
extended to SWFs.193 Likewise, the OECD’s Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises put forward principles 
relevant for SWFs that undertake cross-border investments194 as 
underscored by the European Commission communication on 
SWFs.195  
Additionally, it has been observed that “SWFs do not meet the 
standards set by local financial institutions, which demand rigid 
governance structures and disclosure. As a result, we can infer that 
if SWFs align their governance practices with those of the local 
financial institutions, legitimacy would be granted.”196  
The standards for SWFs should clearly set out: (1) the role of the 
government as well as the managers of the investment mechanism; 
(2) the entity to set the policies; and (3) ultimately provide 
benchmarks for accountability measures and how those policies are 
executed. In its approach, the EU has identified four principles of 
good governance as follows. 
 
EU Principles of Good Governance Applicable to SWFs 
 
 Principles of good governance include: 
o The clear allocation and separation of responsibilities in the 
internal governance structure of a SWF (e.g., operational 
                                               
193  INT’L MONETARY FUND, GUIDELINES FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE 
MANAGEMENT 1 (2001), available at http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/mae/ferm/eng/index.htm. 
194  GUIDELINES 2005, supra note 157. 
195  Commission Communication 2008, supra note 16, at 9. 
196  Ashby Monk, RECASTING THE SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND DEBATE: TRUST, 
LEGITIMACY, AND GOVERNANCE 13 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. For the Env’t Working Papers 
in Emp’t, Work and Fin. No. WPG08-14, 2008) (providing a case study of the China 
Investment Corporation and ultimately criticizing it in the quoted conceptualiza-
tion of how governance affects and is informed by legitimacy). 
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autonomy of the SWF; disclosure of the general principles of 
internal governance that provide assurances of integrity);  
o The development and issuance of an investment policy that 
defines the overall objectives of SWF investment (e.g., 
disclosure of investment positions; disclosure of the currency 
composition of investments; operational autonomy to achieve 
SWF defined objectives); 
o The disclosure of the general principles governing a SWF’s 
relationship with governmental authority (essentially the 
separation of the management of SWF from political 
authorities); and 
o The development and issuance of risk-management policies 
(e.g., policies, procedures and models used by the risk 
managers). 
Source: Author’s understanding of the principles and policies enunciated 
in Commission Communication 2008, supra note 16. 
 
6.  ASSESSING THE RISKS OF EUROPEAN PROTECTIONISM  
 
The recurring debate concerning SWFs may suggest that there 
are few rules that are presently in place to regulate them. However, 
this is not the case. As underscored in its 2008 Communication, EU 
law provides a comprehensive regime to regulate both the 
establishment and the actions of foreign investors, which ultimately 
“covers SWFs in exactly the same way as any other foreign 
investor.”197 This regime has not been weakened by the Treaty of 
Lisbon.198 Further, the TFEU provides the EU with the legal 
framework and tools necessary to meet future challenges.199 
Recent experience shows that the opaque structures of some 
SWFs’ risk prompting defensive reactions from host countries. In 
2008, the Italian government announced that SWFs wanting to buy 
shares in Italian companies should generally stay below 5%, 
suggesting that a new law would be passed to this effect.200 This was 
                                               
197  Commission Communication 2008, supra note 16, at 7 (§ 3.1).  
198  Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 130. 
199  Herein we adopt the renumbering of provisions of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union. TFEU, supra note 109. 
200  Guy Dinmore, Italy Set to Curb Sovereign Wealth Funds FIN. TIMES Oct. 21, 
2008, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1709cf92-9f09-11dd-98bd-
000077b07658.html#axzz3pYLhsCf6. 
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a reaction to the purchase by Libya, a former Italian colony, of a 
4.23% stake in the second largest Italian bank, UniCredit SpA.201 
However, shortly after this announcement, Foreign Minister Franco 
Frattini said that there is no need for a threshold, but rather that 
there is need for transparency.202 Such an abrupt change in direction 
can be interpreted as the abandonment of any plan to pass a new 
domestic law (confirmed by the fact that, since 2008, no relevant 
change in Italian law has occurred), and to refer to the multilateral 
approach supported at the supranational level by the EU.  In fact, 
Italy waited until March 2012 before deciding to introduce a new 
law that gives special power to review foreign investment to the 
Government.203  The law distinguishes between two sectors, which 
receive different types of scrutiny and consequences.  The law does 
not define the sectors clearly but requires that the government 
specify which are the strategic security activities for the defense 
sector204 and which are the networks, power-plants and assets of 
strategic relevance for the energy, transportation and 
communications a minimum of every three years.205  In the case of a 
real threat to the essential interests of defense and national security, 
the government can impose conditions with respect to the security 
of the procurements, transfer of technology, etc.,206 veto mergers and 
acquisitions,207 and oppose the transfer of ownership of shares from 
a company that operates in strategic activities relevant for the 
national security to entities that might acquire ownership and 
voting rights in order to compromise defense and national 
security.208 The government can also veto board and shareholder 
decisions or transactions that pose a serious threat to the public 
interest in the safety and operation of the networks and plants, and 
to the continuity of the procurement of the service.209  At this stage, 
                                               
201  Id. 
202  No Need to Cap Sovereign Fund Holdings, REUTERS, Oct. 23, 2008, available at 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2008/10/23/italy-funds-frattini-id-
INRAT00420320081023. 
203  Law decree 21/2012 amended and converted into law L. 11 maggio 2012, 
n. 56, GAZZETTA UFFICIALE, May 11, 2012, available at http://www.gazzettauffi-
ciale.it/gunewsletter/dettaglio.jsp?service=1&datagu=2012-03-
15&task=dettaglio&numgu=63&redaz=012G0040&tmstp=1332753773322. 
204  Id. at Art. 1. 
205  Id. at Art. 2. 
206  Id. at Art. 1, comma 1. 
207  Id. at Art. 1, comma 2. 
208  Id. at Art. 1, comma 3. 
209  Id. at Art. 2, comma 3. 
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the analyzed provisions do not seem to create a serious protectionist 
barrier to foreign investors because the law has been enforced in 
many operations involving State-Controlled Entities (SCEs) have 
occurred in Italy.210  
The United Kingdom and France, however, have already 
introduced legislation that would allow them to fend off 
investments from SWFs.211 Germany passed a new law that came 
into force in April 2009. All three examples are further explored 
below. 
We think that any discussion of foreign investment by SWFs 
must recognize the differences in investment objectives between 
different types of SCEs.212 These differences in investment objectives 
justify, at the European level, permitting countries to adopt minimal 
safeguard provisions. Accommodating for such minimal safeguard 
provisions would provide a means of oversight for the few 
exceptional cases, and filter out possible threats to national security 
interests. In other words, the twenty-seven member states of the EU 
should have the power to block investments only in sensitive, 
security-related sectors. Restricting the flow of capital for other 
reasons will lead to infringement proceedings launched by the 
Commission against any member state that fails to comply with EU 
law and regulations.213 
Such national measures should not contradict the common 
European approach advocated by the Commission on the basis of 
                                               
210  See Mubadala Completes 100% Takeover of Piaggio, ARABIAN AEROSPACE, Sept. 
18, 2015, available at http://www.arabianaerospace.aero/mubadala-completes-
100-takeover-of-piaggio.html (reporting that the Mubadala Development Com-
pany has acquired total control of Piaggio Aereo SpA);  Francesca Landini, CDP 
Inks Final Deal to Sell Italy's Grid Assets to China, REUTERS, Nov. 27, 2014, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/27/italy-china-grid-assets-
idUSI6N0T002220141127 (reporting that the State Grid corporation of China has 
signed a preliminary agreement for the acquisition of 35% shares in CDP Reti). 
211  In the UK, Enterprise Act of 2002, 2002, c. 40 (U.K.) [hereinafter Enterprise 
Act] (stating multi fair competition related objects and purposes of the Act . In 
France, Décret 2005-1739, infra note 230. In Germany, Dreizehntes Gesetz zur Än-
derung des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes und der Außenwirtschaftsverordnung vom 
[Thirteenth Law Amending the Foreign Trade and Payments Act], April 18, 2009, 
BGBL. I at 1150 (Ger.),  available at http://www.hohmann-part-
ner.com/rechtsvorschriften/2010/awg_englisch-2009.pdf. Both were enacted as of 
mid-2011. 
212  Greene & Yeager, supra note 43, at 247. 
213  Article 258 TFEU regulates the infringement proceedings against a Mem-
ber State, which in the opinion of the Commission infringes Community law. The 
Commission can try to bring the infringement to an end, and, if necessary, may 
refer the case to the ECJ. 
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the principles supported by the European Council. All national 
measures must be envisaged in the context of a common European 
approach, which they should complement. Europe must avoid any 
uncoordinated responses that could send the wrong message about 
the EU stepping back from its commitment to being a welcoming 
environment for investments.  
For these reasons there is a need for the Commission to analyze 
the existing initiatives, establish effective coordination, and ensure 
that that coordination does not encroach upon national prerogatives 
and competences in terms of protection. This analysis of European 
practices should be undertaken and directed by the European 
Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs. We will detail existing laws in three countries of the EU: the 
United Kingdom, France, and Germany. These three countries 
appear to be the most relevant examples because they are the main 
destinations for investment within the EU, while simultaneously 
being three important actors in the decision-making process within 
the EU. Whether or not a United States-style regime—encapsulated 
by the CFIUS—should be established in the EU, any such decision 
would require the support of these three countries. 
 
6.1. Control of foreign takeovers in the United Kingdom 
 
In the United Kingdom, corporate M&As can, in principle, be 
reviewed for the purpose of protecting investors and ensuring fair 
competition through the Enterprise Act of 2002.214 A merger 
situation can be considered under the competition legislation if 
either or both of the following tests are satisfied: (1) an acquisition 
of a UK enterprise valued in excess of £70 million, or (2) the resulting 
combined business will account for more than 25% of a supply 
market of a good or service within the United Kingdom or a 
substantial part of it. The substantive test applied to the merger is 
whether it may be expected to result in a substantial lessening of 
competition as a result of the transaction.215 
The government can intervene in M&As in areas of national 
security and the media if acquisition is deemed to be against the 
                                               
214  See Enterprise Act, supra note 212 (stating multi fair competition related 
objects and purposes of the Act); see generally Cosmo Graham, The Enterprise Act 
2002 and Competition Law, 67 MOD. L. REV. 273 (2004) [hereinafter Graham]. 
215  See Graham, supra note 215, at 277.  
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public interest.216   Among many other things,217  the Enterprise Act 
2002 makes the United Kingdom’s Competition Commission 
determinative in merger cases and in market investigations—which 
replace the complex monopoly investigations established under the 
Fair Trading Act 1973—and which change the substantive question 
for these investigations. While the inquiry used to be whether 
particular matters operate or might operate against the public 
interest,218  the Enterprise Act of 2002 changes the inquiry to turn on 
one of four tests. The first is a qualified public interest test, which 
applies in cases that raise specific public interest issues (e.g., national 
security or media).219  The second is a test of prejudice in the context of 
water enterprises, which is applied by the Office of Water Supply’s 
ability to make comparisons between water enterprises in the 
context of mergers between water companies.220  This test is 
particularly relevant in relation to increasing investment by SWFs in 
the water services sector.221  The third test is a substantial lessening of 
competition test. It applies to all other mergers not covered by the first 
two tests.222  The final test is an adverse effects on competition test. This 
                                               
216  See Enterprise Act, supra note 212, at § 58 (U.K.) (stating the statutory pro-
visions for the United Kingdom’s merger regime); The Enterprise Act 2002 (Speci-
fication of Additional Section 58 Consideration) Order 2008, 2008, SI 2008/2645 
(adding the category ‘the interest of maintaining the stability of the UK financial 
system’ as a new consideration.); Dep’t for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Re-
form press notice, 2008, s42(3) (confirming the intention to amend the Act and em-
powering it to instruct the Office of Fair Trading to report on its assessment of the 
merger to the Secretary of State). NB: The department was created on June 28, 2007 
on the disbanding of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and was itself 
disbanded on June 6, 2009 on the creation of the Department for Business, Innova-
tion and Skills, see https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-
for-business-innovation-skills. 
217  See generally Daniel Prentice, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Enterprise Act 
2002, 5 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. R. 153 (2004). 
218  The Enterprise Act 2002 (Specification of Additional Section 58 Considera-
tion) Order 2008, 2008, SI 2008/2645. 
219  Enterprise Act, supra note 200, at §§ 58(A)–(C). 
220  Id. at § 89 (1). 
221  Thames Water Holding Plc., the company that provides water and sewer-
age services in the areas of London, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Gloucestershire, 
Kent, Oxfordshire, Surrey and Wiltshire, has among its shareholders China Invest-
ment Corporation and Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, holding almost nine and 
ten percent, respectively.  China’s CIC Buys 8.68% Stake in U.K.’s Thames Water Util-
ities, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 20, 2012, available at http://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2012-01-20/china-s-cic-acquires-8-68-stake-in-u-k-s-
thames-water-utilities. 
222  Id. at §§ 47, 63. 
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test applies in market investigations where it is believed that market 
features have an adverse effect on competition.223 
Even if traditionally more liberal than continental Europe, the 
United Kingdom, through its Chancellor, Alistair Darling at the time 
of writing this Article, supported the pursuit of the G7 to toughen 
its stance towards SWFs.224  Darling warned foreign governments 
that the United Kingdom would not tolerate politically motivated 
investments in key UK companies. These comments were intended 
as a warning to Russia that the United Kingdom would not tolerate 
Russia’s state-owned energy company taking a stake in Centrica, the 
majority shareholder of British Gas.225  The Russian state-owned gas 
and oil conglomerate, GazProm who already supplies around a 
quarter of the EU gas demand and has re-acquired most of the 
pipelines running from Central Asia to Europe, would not be a 
welcome bidder for United Kingdom gas grid operator Centrica. 
 
6.2. Control of foreign takeovers in France 
 
In 2004 France modified its Monetary and Financial Code.226 The 
new Article L 151-3 strictly limits the field of control to the reasons 
expressly indicated in Article 346 of the TFEU (national defense)227 
and Article 65-1 (public order and public security). Following the 
2005 rumor of a takeover of Danone by the American company 
PepsiCo,228 the French Economy Minister announced the publication 
of a Decree allowing French authorities to control foreign inward 
                                               
223  Id. 
224  Larry Elliot, Chancellor Backs G7 Move to Get Tough on Sovereign Wealth 
Funds: 'Political' Investments Not Tolerated, Says Darling: Concerns Grow Over Asset 
Power in China and Russia, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 19, 2007, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/oct/20/1. 
225  Michael Harrison, Could Russia’s Gazprom Go for National Grid? It’s Not 
Quite As Far-Fetched As It May Seem?, INDEPENDENT, Oct. 20, 2011, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/michael-harrisons-
outlook-could-russias-gazprom-go-for-national-grid-its-not-quite-as-far-fetched-
as-433748.html. 
226  Loi 2004-1343 du 9 décembre 2004 de simplification du droit [Law 2004-1343 of 
December 9, 2004 on the Simplification of the Law], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE] 20875 (2004). 
227  TFEU, supra note 109, at art. 346.  
228  Carol Matlack, Could PepsiCo Digest Danone? , BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, July 20, 
2005, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2005-07-20/could-pep-
sico-digest-danone. 
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investments in France. Decree 2005-1739 delimits the sectors 
concerned and ensures full respect for the EU principle of 
proportionality.229 For the purposes of the Decree, an investment is 
defined as: (1) acquiring control, within the meaning of Article L. 
233-3 of the Commercial Code, a company whose headquarters is in 
France; (2) to either directly or indirectly acquire all or part of an 
industry of a company whose headquarters is in France; and (3) or 
crosses the threshold of 33.33% of direct or indirect ownership of the 
capital or voting rights of a company whose headquarters is based 
in France.230 
Decree 2005-1739 introduces disparate treatment of investments 
on the basis of the origin of the investment—i.e., investments of 
member states versus third-state investments.  The scope of this 
authorization procedure is more extensive for investments 
originating from third countries—this is possible under Article 64 of 
the Treaty—as this measure existed prior to November 30, 1993, 
when the Maastricht Treaty came into force.231  However, because 
indirect investments are also subject to authorization, the procedure 
could also foreseeably create a restriction on investments for third-
state investments by companies that are legally established in the 
EU, but which have shareholders established in third countries.  
This difference in treatment, which is permitted by the rules of 
the WTO and TFEU Article 64, leads to a continuation of the 
previously applicable regime for operations originating in third 
countries, but with greater precision in the field of application.  For 
EU investors, on the other hand, only those operations leading to the 
effective transfer of a sensitive activity will be concerned. The 
objective is clear: France can oppose the relocation of activities or 
product stocks (e.g., vaccines needed in case of a bio-terrorist attack) 
essential to its security or defense. Moreover, Decree 2005-1739 sets 
out in Article R. 153-1 a clear list of eleven sectors which are 
considered strategic, and in which investment can be subject to 
                                               
229  Décret 2005-1739 du 30 décembre 2005 réglementant les relations finan-
cières avec l’étranger et portant application de l’article L. 151-3 (V) du code moné-
taire et financier [Decree 2005-1739 of December 30, 2005 Regulating Financial Re-
lations with Foreign Countries and Implementing Article L. 151-3 (V) of the 
Monetary and Financial Code], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA République FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE] 20779 (2005) [hereinafter Décret 2005-1739]; see also 
Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis, supra note 3, at 83.  
230  Décret 2005-1739, supra note 230, at art. 1–3. 
231  Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, March 1957, 
E.T.S. No.1. available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/ALL/?uri=URISERV:xy0023. 
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authorization.232  The national security rationale for this list is quite 
clear, although the Decree has not been formally applied so far.233 
After an initial warning,234 the Commission has formally 
requested that France amend the Decree to bring it in compliance 
with the governing EU treaties as they apply to authorizing 
procedures for foreign investments in delineated sectors and 
activities that could affect public policy, public security, or national 
defense.235 The Commission considers Decree 2005-1739’s restriction 
on investment as “incompatible with the free movement of capital 
and the freedom of establishment.”236 The formal request sent in 
October 2006 signaled the start of an infringement procedure,237 
which has not been implemented by the Commission. In substance, 
the Commission questioned whether the decree respected the free 
circulation of capital and the freedom of establishment within the 
EU because it subjects non-EU investors to a more restrictive 
approval regime. More precisely, the European Commission 
                                               
232  See Décret 2005-1739, supra note 230 (listing a total of eleven strategic sec-
tors: money gambling and casino activities; private security services; research, de-
velopment or production of pathogens or toxic substances for unlawful use or ter-
rorist activities; wire tapping and mail interception equipment; testing and 
certification of the security of information technology products and systems; goods 
or services related to the information security systems of companies managing crit-
ical infrastructure; dual-use (civil and military) items and technologies; cryptology 
services; activities of firms entrusted with national defense secrets; research, pro-
duce or trade in weapons; munitions, and explosive substances intended for mili-
tary purposes; any business supplying the French defense ministry with any of the 
goods or services described above.). 
233  See e.g., Ben Hall, Danaher Move for Ingenico Blocked, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 21, 
2010, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/0bfaefbe-0bc7-11e0-a313-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3qDPuL4Kr. 
(reporting that the French Government threatened to make use of the 2005 Decree 
during an attempted merger between US Danaher and Ingenico, but did not ulti-
mately seek to enforce the Decree). 
234  European Commission, Free Movement of Capital: Commission Scruti-
nises French Law Establishing Authorisation Procedure for Foreign Investments in 
Certain Sectors Press Release No. IP/06/438 of 4 April 2006), available at http://eu-
ropa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-438_en.htm. 
235  European Commission, Free Movement of Capital: Commission Calls on 
France to Modify Its Legislation Establishing an Authorisation Procedure for For-
eign Investments in Certain Sectors of Activity Press Release No. IP/06/1353 of 
October 12, 2006 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-06-
1353_en.htm [hereinafter Free Movement of Capital]. 
236  Id. 
237  TFEU, supra note 109, at art. 258; see generally Jan-Krzysztof Dunin-
Wasowicz, Note, The Transparency Regulation in Context: A Proxy for Legitimacy or an 
Instrument of Regulatory Practice?, 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 465 (2010). 
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expressed concerns238 which have been ignored by the French 
government until now, that some of the provisions in this Decree 
could discourage investments from other member states and they 
are in contravention of EU Treaty rules on the free movement of 
capital (Article 63) and the right of establishment (Article 42).  These 
additional requirements on European companies owned or 
controlled by third state investors would also contravene the 
principle of Article 47 (former Article 48), which states that 
companies established in member states should be treated as 
nationals of such member states.  
Article R153-2 “Provisions relating to foreign investments from 
third countries” was modified in 2009 and in 2012. The last 
amendment, Decree 2014-479, was introduced in May 2014 
following the General Electric bid to acquire the energy branch of 
Alstom; the media termed this amendment the “Alstom Decree.”239  
These amendments detail the requirements for foreign investors 
making investments in certain sensitive sectors such as gambling, 
private security, telecommunications, IT security, cryptology, and 
military and defense.  The Alstom Decree further specifes the 
business sectors for which the foreign investor is required to attain 
governmental approval prior to investing, they are: a) supply of 
electricity, gas, oil and other energy resources, b) supply of water in 
accordance with public health regulations, c) operation of 
transportation networks, d) operation of electronic communications 
networks, e) activities specified in the French Defense Code, and f) 
protection of public health.240  The Alstom Decree also modified 
Article R153-9, making further reference to the French Defense Code 
on matters of protection against terrorist threats. 241 
                                               
238  Free Movement of Capital, supra note 236. 
239  See Hugh Carnegy, Michael Stothard & Elizabeth Rigby, French ‘Nuclear 
Weapon’ Against Foreign Takeovers Sparks UK Blast, FIN. TIMES, May 15, 2014, available 
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1d386c96-dbeb-11e3-a460-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3tBBlqgKk.  
240  Article R153-2, LEGIFRANCE, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/af-
fichCodeArticle.do;jses-
sionid=53EA388BCF910EF7A172A44E421F6E27.tpdila08v_2?cidTexte=LEGITEXT
000006072026&idArti-
cle=LEGIARTI000006679886&dateTexte=20151202&categorieLien=cid#LEGIARTI
000006679886. 
241  See Consolidated Article R153-9 after the 2014 Decree, Articles L. 1332-1 
and L. 1332-2 of the Defense Code, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/af-
fichCodeArticle.do;jses-
sionid=365ED42A046173DF14F6C081AA5A01CE.tpdila08v_2?cidTexte=LEGITEX
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6.3. Control of foreign takeovers in Germany 
 
The ownership structure of corporations in the Deutscher Aktien 
IndeX (DAX)—a blue chip stock market index comprised of 30 major 
German corporations that trade on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange—
demonstrates Germany’s openness to foreign investments, 
including those by SWFs. Foreign investors hold stakes in many 
DAX companies. In particular, sovereign funds from Kuwait and 
Dubai are shareholders in leading DAX companies like Daimler and 
Deutsche Bank.242    However, in Germany there is a growing 
concern that an SWF could decide to purchase a large German 
company such as Deutsche Telecom, Deutsche Bank, or Deutsche 
Bahn.243  
While the above attest to recognition of the import of national 
security in the economic realm, this has not led to further 
protectionist measures. Stork reports as of mid-2010 that German 
government officials appear troubled by a number of diverse issues 
and recent developments, including: (1) the ability of SWFs to 
leverage cash to make large acquisitions; (2) a potential indirect 
takeover of one of Germany’s largest banks by a foreign 
government; (3) state-controlled investors buying small engineering 
companies to siphon off intellectual property; and (4) national 
security concerns that may arise if parts of the German 
infrastructure are acquired by political investors rather than 
investors driven by commercial imperatives.244 
In 2008, the Cabinet of Germany’s Bundesministerium fur 
Wirtschaft und Technologie [Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology] (BMWi) issued a proposed amendment to the 
Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes und der Außenwirtschaftsverordnung 
[Foreign Trade Act and Foreign Trade Regulation] (FTA).  The 
                                               
T000006072026&idArti-
cle=LEGIARTI000028936324&dateTexte=20151202&categorieLien=cid#LEGIARTI
000028936324. 
242  Jochen Möbert & Patrick Tydecks, Power and Ownership Structures Among 
German Companies: A Network Analysis of Financial Linkages, Darmstadt Technical 
University, Institute of Economics (VWL), Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Eco-
nomics, No. 35974 at 7 (2007). 
243  Von Rudzio, Chinesen Wollen Die Deutsche Bahn [Chinese Want the German 
Railways], ZEIT  ONLINE , Sept. 10, 2008, available at 
http://www.zeit.de/2008/37/Macher-und-Maerkte. 
244  Florian Stork, A Practical Approach to the New German Foreign Investment Re-
gime–Lessons to be Learnt from Merger Control, GER. L. J.  260 (2010) [hereinafter 
Stork].  
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amendment, which was subsequently accepted by the German 
Parliament,245 is aimed at protecting strategic national industries 
from unwanted foreign takeovers.  As amended in 2009, the FTA 
vests Germany’s federal government with the power to veto any 
investment from non-EU or European Free Trade Association 
countries246 amounting to 25% or more of a company’s stakes if it 
deems that ‘public security’ or ‘public order’ is at risk247.  
Based on the US model, Germany’s plans could lead to further 
attempts across the across the member states aimed at blocking 
foreign investment incursions into sensitive industries.  US 
inspiration is obvious in the German pre-notification procedure.  
Foreign investors can pre-notify the German administration, on a 
voluntary basis, before an intended acquisition.  The administration 
can then clear the acquisition and provide a level of legal certainty 
to the investor.  Under Germany’s proposals,  ‘public order and 
security’ are the principal criteria for triggering a review of foreign 
groups’ investment plans. 
Within Germany there seems to be a slight contradiction 
between private and public interests.  German business 
associations— Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag 
[Germany’s International Chamber of Commerce as well as the 
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie [Federation of German Industries] 
(BDI)— did not support the government decision and expressed 
doubts as the decision is alleged to go against EU rules on the free 
movement of capital.248   The BDI insists that the law is in breach of 
                                               
245  Dreizehntes Gesetz zur Änderung des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes und der 
Außenwirtschaftsverordnung [Thirteenth Law Amending the Foreign Trade and 
Payments Act], April 18, 2009, BGBL. I at 1150 (Ger.), available at 
http://www.hohmann-partner.com/rechtsvorschriften/2010/awg_englisch-
2009.pdf. For a statement from the Ministry of Economy and Technology, see Bun-
desministerium fur Wirtschaft und Technologie [Fed. Ministry of Econ. and Tech.], 
Kabinett beschließt 13. Gesetz zur Änderung des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes und 
der Außenwirtschaftsverordnung [Cabinet Approves Thirteenth Act Amending 
the Foreign Trade Act and Foreign Trade Regulation], Aug. 8, 2008, available at 
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/Presse/pressemittei-
lungen,did=266018.html (acceptance of the amendment).  For analysis of the Act, 
see generally Stork, supra note 245.  
246  The European Fair Trade Association (EFTA) is comprised of Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. 
247  Thirteenth Law Amending the Foreign Trade and Payments Act, Apr. 18, 
2009, Section 7 § 1 Article 4, available at http://www.hohmann-part-
ner.com/rechtsvorschriften/2010/awg_englisch-2009.pdf. 
248  Germany Moves to Protect Companies from Foreign Takeovers, DEUTSCHE 
WELLE, Aug. 20, 2008, available at http://www.dw.com/en/germany-moves-to-
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EU Treaty rules on the free movement of capital (Article 63) and the 
right of establishment (Article 42), which it interprets as being 
equally applicable to EU and non-EU investors.  The BDI further 
argues that the FTA’s definition of national security is too broad.249  
In 2014, Michael Glos, Germany’s Economics Minister, insisted 
that the mechanism would be used only in “extremely rare” cases250 
and that “Germany is and remains open to [foreign] investors.”251  
The government further argues that the law merely brings Germany 
into line with existing legislation in France, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States.252   In other words, just as other countries have 
already done, Germany is creating governmental means of 
oversight for few exceptional cases and to rule out a possible threat 
to national security interests.  Investment protectionism or an 
overall rejection of investments by sovereign funds, now and in the 
future, will not and cannot occur in Germany. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
 
The European Commission expected member states to strongly 
signal their readiness to take joint action to avoid a repeat of the 
financial turmoil that hit the global economy after the US mortgage 
crisis in summer 2007.  As the current financial turmoil of 2008–2009 
demonstrated, financial liquidity is vital for Western economies.253  
We have recently witnessed how firms on both sides of the 
Atlantic— e.g., Barclays and Citibank—have sought out sovereign 
funds. Investments by SWFs were needed to allow these companies 
                                               
protect-companies-from-foreign-takeovers/a-3580978 (reporting on Germany’s In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce (ICC) decision to defend the view that “[f]oreign 
investment brings many advantages such as economic growth, employment and as 
a result rising living standards” and The Federation of German Industry (BDI) say-
ing that German law would send “the wrong signal for Germany as a place to in-
vest”). 
249  Id. 
250  Bertrand Benoit, Berlin Foreign Investors’ Bill Clears Hurdles, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 
20, 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ac2762d6-6eff-11dd-a80a-
0000779fd18c.html#axzz3qDPuL4Kr. 
251  Id. 
252  Id. 
253  See Brendan J. Reed, Note, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The New Barbarians at the 
Gate? Analysis of the Legal and Business Implications of their Ascendancy, 4 VA. L. & 
Bus. REV. 97, 103 (2009) (discussing how sovereign wealth funds affect liquidity and 
thus affect the secondary market). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/3
 
2015] DEMYSTIFYING SECURITY EXCEPTION 645 
to fulfill their strategic aims and, as a result, attitudes towards SWFs 
shifted sharply in 2008.  Whereas SWFs had been initially greeted 
with outright suspicion, they ultimately became a pre-eminent 
source of global capital in the post-crisis era. 
However, SWFs have yet to take great strides in purchasing EU 
strategic assets.  For example, Russian SWFs have not attempted to 
buy into any strategic assets; instead, they have taken very limited 
stakes in companies. Even this action piques the curiosity of the 
European Commission and the member state governments.  But 
there is no evidence at the moment that these SWFs are being used 
for any nefarious purpose.  Of course, it cannot be ignored that 
national security is a potentially crucial concern, even when the 
proposed buyer is a private company (e.g., where the state and the 
private sector are heavily intertwined in the buyer’s home state). 
SWFs are not newcomers to the investment scene; rather, they 
have been investing in Europe for decades.254  SWFs, as responsible 
and reliable investors, have pursued a long-term and stable policy 
towards investment that has stood the test of time during the Global 
Financial Crisis.  Moreover, these funds provided capital just when 
it was most desperately needed during the initial stages of the crisis. 
Given the aforementioned, investing countries may well be entitled 
to seek the best way to invest their reserves in foreign currency.  
Overall, SWFs improve the liquidity of the financial markets and 
create growth and jobs.  They also contribute to investment for the 
longer term and create stability for the companies in which they 
invest.  
Over the years, the free movement of capital has contributed to 
growth in the Common Market and in other markets around the 
world.  Thus, it is important that the EU does not adopt policies that 
may endanger market stability in the future, such as overregulation 
and protectionism.  Instead, it should abide by free market 
principles. Hence, two clear conclusions can be drawn at this stage.  
                                               
254  See, e.g., Interview with the Head of the Kuwait Investment Authority: We Are 
Being Punished, DER SPIEGEL, May 19, 2008, available at http://www.spiegel.de/in-
ternational/business/spiegel-interview-with-the-head-of-the-kuwait-investment-
authority-we-are-being-punished-a-554042.html (reporting that the Kuwait Invest-
ment Authority (KIA)—one of the oldest and richest SWFs, has been a major share-
holder of the German car manufacturer Daimler since 1974); see also Jim Henry, Abu 
Dhabi Becomes Biggest Daimler Shareholder, CBS NEWS, Mar. 24, 2009, available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/abu-dhabi-becomes-biggest-daimler-share-
holder/ (noting that the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and the State of Kuwait are the big-
gest shareholders of German car manufacturer Daimler, with equity stakes of 9.1% 
and 6.9%, respectively). 
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First, it appears that a new wave of protectionism against foreign 
ownership represents a reinvigoration of protectionism from years 
past.  Second, any domestic or EU regulation would undermine any 
message that the EU (or individual member states) is a good place 
to invest.  Europe must remain an attractive place for investment. 
SWFs are the by-products of increasing globalization and of the 
benefits of international trade.  Thus far, they have only proved to 
be good shareholders.  They are interested in the long-term, positive 
development of their business and, as a result, also interested in 
obtaining a good, long-term rate of return on their investments.  The 
EU should, therefore, continue to allow SWFs to invest in the 
Common Market.  
These funds can, however, pose threats and both the types of 
investments they are making and whether those investments meet 
the transparency requirements should be scrutinized.  Without 
continued inward investment, the EU economy will stagnate.  The 
EU has no interest in erecting barriers to investment and it considers 
sovereign investment as an important engine for worldwide 
economic growth.  If the EU were to restrict the activities of SWFs 
within the European borders, it might find itself at an economic 
disadvantage, with significant investment dollars going to other 
parts of the world. There is a risk of seeing a strategy being 
implemented in each of the member states that, ultimately, would 
not help to tackle the reality. There is a need to clarify, at the 
European level, which sectors should be protected from foreign 
takeovers beyond the vague criteria of public order and public 
security, as enunciated. Such a list of EU strategic sectors could, and 
in fact should, be drafted so that energy, technologies, and other 
relevant sectors are set apart from the regulation of sectors subject 
to competition regulation. In addition, public mistrust of overseas 
investment and isolationist sentiment could cause an overreaction 
to the question of regulation. This could have far-reaching 
consequences not only financially, but also in terms of diplomatic 
and economic relationships with other nations. For example, 
European leaders have not adopted different policies when dealing 
with Russia as from when they are dealing with the United States. 
To this extent, there is a need to clarify the interpretation of Article 
65 TFEU, which provides for restrictions on the free movement of 
capital on the grounds of public order. Although never employed 
vis-à-vis SWFs, it is worthwhile ensuring that member states will not 
be tempted to make extensive use of it. 
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